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It commands the future:




Intense guerilla warfare has engulfed the Ethiopian
province of Eritrea since 1976. On the one hand, the
"Popular Front for the Liberation of Eritrea" (P.F.L.E.)
enjoys some popular support. It also receives economic
and military assistance from Somalia, South Yemen, and
Syria. On the other hand, the Eritrean Liberation Front
(E.L.F.), like the P.F.L.E., is fighting for "true self-
determination" of the Eritrean people, with the backing
of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In addition, the Ethiopian
military government is striving to maintain the state's
territorial integrity. To this end it receives assis-
tance from the Soviet Union, Cuba and Israel.1
Aside from its currency, there is little that is
earth-shattering about this conflict; it has been ac-
corded minor coverage by the media. The conflict does
illustrate, however, many of the thorny problems con-
fronting contemporary international law. The course of
contemporary international affairs is determined at least
as much by internal events as by international crises. 2
One of the principal ways in which internal relations
influence world order is certainly when they involve
1, Morriset, La guerlla en Erythree, Le Devoir, Dec. 9, 1977,
at 14,
2, See P. Caluocoressi, World Order and New States 101 (1962).
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violent conflicts. Although it has long been acknow-
ledged that such conflicts could have important reper-
cussions on a global level, 3 interest in this subject
on the part of the international legal community is
relatively recent.
The principal reason for this growing interest is
the substantial number of "internal conflicts" hat the
world has witnessed since the Second World War. One
jurist has predicted, for the near future, from ten to
fifteen revolutions a year in Third World countries.5
In 1964, the New York Times enumerated over a thousand
cases of "unequivocal" civil wars, internal riots, ter-
rorist attacks and coups. 6 This serious increase in
the number of internal conflicts has been accompanied by
a radical decrease in the number of classical inter-
state "wars of aggression"7 and, as the Eritrean example
suggests, by an increase in the involvement of foreign
states in internal conflicts. In light of the present
hostilities in Angola, Cambodia, Eritrea, Iraq, the
Ogaden, Spanish Sahara, and Chad (to name only a few),
one wonders if Rousseau could posit with the same con-
viction of two centuries ago that "la guerre est une
relation d'Etat h Etat", i.e., "[Wiar is a relation of
State to State".
In this paper, we intend to delineate the state of
international law on this subject by proposing an answer
to the following question: "What norms does the interna-
tional community enunciate concerning the relations that
foreign states should have with the parties to an in-
ternal conflict?" At the risk of accusations of "forma-
lism"8 or "legalism," we shall refrain from suggesting
de lege ferenda solutions, while nonetheless referring
3. See Higgins, International Law and Civil Conflict, in The
International Regulation of Civil War 169 (E. Luard ed. 1972).
4. The causes of this increasing number of "internal con-
flicts" will be commented upon briefly infra pp. 230-432.
5. C. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (1966), cited
with approval in Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in
International Conflict, 9 Va. J. Int'l L. 205, 209 (1969).
6. Quoted in R. Oglesby, Internal War and the Search for
Normative Order 100 (1971).
7. See note 209 infra.
8. See Chaumont, Commentaries, 55 Annuaire de L'Institut de
droit international 530 (1953).
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to Section 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice as the source of contemporary law.9
Some jurists reject these rules out of hand, by adduc-
ing conflicts, such as the one in Eritrea, which would
appear to negate them. We stress that international
legal norms, as is the case for those of municipal law,
may exist even if they are not fully respected. The
fact that rules have been transgressed does not reduce
their normative force, unless the transgressions are
sufficiently numerous and manifest the intentions of
the international community to eliminate them and to
create new ones.
Some authors have held that international legal
principles are today nothing more than simple myths
that, while useful in law courses, have little bearing
on the conduct of states. It is becoming increasingly
evident that this thesis is not entirely unfounded, and
the claim that it springs from a "neo-juridisme batard
issu du croisement du droit naturel et de la science
politique"lO will not suffice. It is, however, possi-
ble to respond eloquently to these critics, as does
Professor Brownlie:
The United Nations Charter, and the rules
of International Law existing apart from
the Charter, are but imperfect instruments
9. The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such dis-
putes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
(a) international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states;
(b) international custom, as evidence of
a general practice accepted as law;
(c) the general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations;
(d) subject to the provisions of article
59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rule of law.
Statute of I.C.J. art. 38(l).
10. I.e. "neo-juridicalism, the mongrel issue of the cross
breeding of natural law and political science". Pinto, Les r~gles du
droit international concernant la guerre civile, 114 Recueil des
cours de l'Academig de droit international de La Haye 465 (1965).
[hereinafter cited as Recueil des cours].
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for preventing conflict, yet they
have the merit of existing here and
now.1 1
Our starting point will be the assumption that
states, and people generally, agree that their common
interest lies in the respect of the Charter and of the
customs to which it refers.12
To determine the international norms concerning the
relations that foreign states should have with the
parties to an internal conflict, three competing doc-
trines will be examined. Only one of them, in our
opinion, reflects the state of contemporary law. Each
doctrine involves certain difficulties, which we shall
note throughout the study as well as in our conclusions.
Finally, a "new development"--the concept of the right
of all peoples to determine their own future--will be
analyzed in order to identify its possible effects on
the "traditional" state of the law.
Note on the terminology
It seems appropriate to justify the choice of the
term, "internal conflict", in preference to the conven-
tional nomenclature, "civil war." The choice of terms
is not based solely on the possibility that the latter
expression might be contradictory;1 3 consideration of
certain key elements of contemporary international law
is a more determinant factor.14
11. I. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by
States at vii (1965).
12. See E. Rostow, Is the United Nations Charter Going the
Way of the League of Nations' Covenant? in The Ideal In Law 263
(1978).
13. See the quotation from Rousseau, supra p. 174.
14. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4) which renders the legal status
of "war" doubtful, See also art. 2(7) which largely exempts in-
ternal "matters" from U.N. control. Also, the near-disappearance
of the classic "Declaration of War," which will be discussed later,
leads us to choose the term "conflicts" rather than "wars." See
Mayerowitz, La gugrilla et le droit de la guerre, 7 Revue belge de
droit international 67 (1971).
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The definition that we have given to "internal con-
flict" is essentially classical. In armed inter-state
conflict all the protagonists are fully subject to inter-
national law. By contrast, internal armed conflict is
characterized by a fundamental inequality in that at
most only one of the parties has state status (or, to be
more precise, the status of being the legal representa-
tive of the state in question).15 Thus, "colonial liber-
ation wars," inter-ethnic conflicts and military putsches
have always been considered "internal conflicts,"1 6 This
legal imbalance is at the root of the first of the three
legal doctrines on the subject of'foreign states and in-
ternal conflicts which we shall examine.
Chapter 1: In Search of the
State of Law
Preliminary Remarks
Mention has already been made of the Eritrean con-
flict, In Ogaden, where ethnic Somali forces are also
fighting to obtain their independence from Ethiopia, the
government of Ethiopia has called upon Cuban military
aid to combat the secessionists, This assistance is a
source of concern to the West, especially to the United
States. American protests, however, have not dealt with
the right that Cuba has to support the Ethiopian govern-
ment. Instead, they have been concerned with the advis-
ability of such an important intervention in the context
of detente, which many have regarded as a symbolic truce
on ideological expansion.17 Ethiopia has frequently in-
15. The following caveat seems appropriate here: this gener-
ally accepted definition of "internal conflict" presupposes indi-
visibility in the legal representation of a state. Such a presump-
tion is at times overtly contested by authors whose opinions will
be examined pp. 210-13 infjra. See E. Castren, Civil War 31 (1966).
16. "Colonial liberation wars" have greatly contributed to
the crystallizing of international law in this field. See generally,.
Wehberg, La guerre civile et le droit international, 63 Recueil des
cours 13 (1938).
17. The only apparent legal objection deals with the possi-
bility that communist countries had illegally flown over the air-
space of certain foreign states in order to reach Ethiopia, New
York Times, Dec. 14, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 7.
Such American protests vividly underline the lack of complaints
concerning Cuba ts right to be present in the Horn of Africa.
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sisted on, and the West has offered no denial of, its
"sovereign right to call for outside aid to defend its
territorial integrity. ,18
Legal arguments raised in the Ogaden conflict illus-
trate the present importance of "conventional" interna-
tional law in this area. Our inquiry into the state of
law in fact reveals a rather sophisticated normative
system aimed at governing the relations between foreign
states and the parties to an internal conflict. Accord-
ing to one doctrine, this system is distinguished by the
noteworthy advantage that it accords to the established
government. We shall see, however, that this doctrinal
trend has been challenged by two other schools of
thought which attract minority support.
For the moment, let us suggest a priori several
possible norms for determining the conduct of foreign
states toward an incumbent government1 9 and the oppo-
nents of such a regime:2 0
1. The duty of foreign states to
assist the incumbent government,
coupled with a prohibition against
aiding its opponents; 2 1
18. See, e.g., Le Devoir, March 11, 1978, at 17.
19. The term "incumbent government," is preferable to
"legal government." See I. Brownlie, supra note 11, at 323-324.
"Incumbent government" designates a government which has already
exercised sovereignty over the state's territory and which continues
to exercise it over at least a part of that territory. Obviously,
some cases may arise where no government meets these criteria (e.g.,
the Angolan conflict before the triumph of Mr. Neto's forces). In
such cases, the "vacuum" will be filled by a hasty recognition of
one faction as "incumbent." See pp. 201-02 infra; Rousseau, Chronique
des faits internationaux, Revue gdn~rale de droit international
public, N.S., 116-118 (1965).
20. Not included are the logically imaginable hypotheses
implicating the right or duty to assist the opponents, and not the
established government, because such solutions simply do not appear
even plausible in the context of a community of sovereign states.
21. This first solution, which may appear extreme, has al-
ready been advocated by certain states. See, e.g,, League of Na-
tions OJ. 264 (1937) (Mexican declaration during the Spanish War).
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2. The right to assist the incumbent
government, coupled with a prohibition
against aiding its opponents;
3. The right to help any one of the
parties to the internal conflict;
4. A prohibition against assisting
any party to the conflict (i.e.,
obligatory neutrality).
We submit that the dominant trend, both in doctrine
and in practice, results in de facto application of the
second solution through the establishment of a normative
system which we have labeled "belligerency as a juridi-
cal act."'22
I. Belligerency as a Juridical Act: The Principle of
Aid to the Incumbent Government
There is no rule of international law
which forbids the government of one
State to render assistance to the
established legitimate government of
another State with a view to enabling
it to suppress an insurrection against
its authority. Whether it shall render
such aid is entirely a matter of policy
or expediency and raises no question of
right or duty under international law.
22. Many authors describe this majority doctrine as the
"theory of non-intervention"; see, e.g., R. Oglesby, supra note 6.
This description is accurate to the extent that aid to the established
government does not institute an "intervention." Such a designa-
tion, however, is of doubtful utility, Indeed, for many, "non-
intervention" has another meaning--that of a symmetrical prohibi-
tion against assisting any of the parties in a conflict (our
fourth solution). Was it not Tallyrand who said, "non-intervention
est un terme plutat mystgrieux et qui signifie intervention", i.e.,
"[N]on-intervention is a rather mysterious term, which implies in-
tervention,"? This semantic ambiguity of the "non-intervention"
label has led us to discard it in our effort to describe the com-
peting doctrine.
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If assistance is rendered to the legiti-
mate government, it is not a case of un-
lawful intervention, as is the giving of
assistance to rebels who are arrayed
against its authority.2 3
A. Historical Origins of the Doctrine
While the dominant point of view favors continued
support of the incumbent government, it is nonetheless
innovative in the protection, however relative, that it
accords to the opponents of such a government, Indeed,
it is important to note that the division of the globe
into sovereign states began toward the end of the Middle
Ages, long before democratic political theory became
popular. In times of crisis, the solidarity among in-
cumbent governments of different states was quite strong;
the international legitimacy of such governments pro-
ceeded ipso facto from the efficacy of their rule. 2 4
Since each government shared similar political values,
the obvious tendency was to regard foreign rebels as
common enemies. Not surprisingly, this state of affairs
produced a simple legal norm: foreign states might at all
times assist the sovereign in suppressing a rebellion. 2 5
Rebels, on the contrary, had no option whatsoever of ac-
quiring even a limited legal personality, unless and un-
til they managed to overthrow the incumbent government.26
Effects of this early normative system could be felt
until relatively recently. In the seventeenth century,
peace treaties stipulated that, in case of rebellion,
23. Garner, Questions of International Law in the Spanish
Civil War, 31 Am. J. Int'l L. 66, 68 (1937).
24. It goes without saying that inter-state conflicts exis-
ted and were numerous. Moreover, these conflicts were quite legal,
and served as safety-valves which provided for the settlement of
disputes. What we wish to emphasize here is the great homogeneity
of the embryonic inter-state system and the repercussions of such
homogeneity on state attitudes toward internal conflicts.
25. R, Aron, Guerre et paix entre les nations 103-32, 1187
(1956).
26. Even then, there was no guaranty of international capa-
city. See R. Oglesby, supra note 6; Wodie, La secession du 9afra
et le droit international public, 73 Revue generale de droit inter-
national public, N.S., 1036 (1962).
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signatory states would refuse all aid to rebels and
would deliver them to the sovereign authorities. More
recently, the desire to maintain the status quo was
illustrated by the "Tobar doctrine," 2 7 according to
which any regime that had come into power by overthrow-
ing a signatory government would simply not be recog-
nized. Thus, the French army brutally suppressed the
Spanish revolution of 1829, and England, one year
earlier, treated the Portuguese rebels led by Don
Miguel in the same manner. The crushing of the Hungar-
ian uprising of 1848 by Czar Nicolas, in response to
Austria's request (Austria at that time exercising
sovereignty over much of what is now Hungary) is yet
another indication of international solidarity in cases
of internal uprisings.
This solidarity weakened toward the end of the
eighteenth century as rival imperial powers increasing-
ly declined to intervene to prevent the independence of
their opponents' colonies. This change of strategic
interest gradually brought about a change in the legal
norms which, from that time on, provided for the possi-
bility of some international recognition of rebels.
Obviously, such recognition could not be interpreted
as recognition of a government, for to acknowledge a
rebel group as a legitimate government before the end
of hostilities would clearly constitute an illegal in-
tervention into the incumbent government's affairs.
Thus, doctrine and practice gradually created a lesser
form of recognition: the recognition of belligerency.
International conflicts during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries witnessed the birth of this new
rule and the gradual decline of the earlier one. Thus,
when France recognized the rebel colonies of North
America in February of 1776 (i.e., before the final
victory of Washingtonts forces), Great Britain inter-
preted this act as a casus beZli. The recognition of
belligerency was at that time embryonic, and any for-
eign state's act of granting some status to rebels was
seen as an illegal intervention.28 Shortly thereafter,
27. This doctrine was incorporated into treaties in Central
America between 1907 and 1923 and was on several occasions in-
voked by the United States. See Falk, Janus Tormented: The In-
ternational Law of Internal War., in International Aspects of
Civil Strife 231 (J. Rosenau ed. 1962).
28. See note 26 supra.
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however, in 1817, the United States recognized the Span-
ish colonies as belligerents, and did not confer recogni-
tion as states upon them until five years later. Indeed,
it is said that by the time of the American Civil War, a
definite crystallization of the doctrine of recognition
of belligerency had been brought about. 29
Recognition of belligerency was applied with rela-
tive frequency to internal conflicts in the nineteenth
century.30 Such recognition constituted one element of
a normative system by which rights and obligations to-
wards both parties to an internal conflict were imposed
on foreign states. Cardinal features of such a system
were the qualified legality of aid to the incumbent
government, on the one hand, and the prohibition of
assistance to its opponents, on the other,
B. Aid to the Incumbent Government
A distinction must be made between an uprising that
does not have as its objective the overthrow of the
established regime, and an insurrection that is specifi-
cally directed toward violent change in the government
of the state. Our discussion will proceed along the
lines of this distinction.
Moreover, as to those uprisings that do aim at
overthrowing the established government, it is appro-
priate to distinguish between "mere rebellions" and
"belligerency per se." Indeed, there may exist a half-
way point between two phases of internal conflict, par-
ticularly in relation to former American foreign policy. 3 1
29, See McNair, The Law Relating to the Civil War in Spain,
53 L.Q. Rev. 475 (1937). The concept already had a viable exis-
tence before 1861 and was in fact regularly invoked by the United
States. It is thus preferable to speak of "crystallization" rather
than "birth" of this doctrine at the time of the American Civil
War.
30. See 1 J,B. Moore, A Digest of International Law 164-205
(1906),
31. The "state of insurgency" concept is discussed pp. 193-94
infra,
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1. Uprisings Not Aimed at the Overthrow of the
Incumbent Government
Such uprisings as race riots, post-earthquake loot-
ings, or demonstrations against a specific government
policy are not normally aimed at replacement of a
regime. 3 2 One such uprising occurred in 1964, when
Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian soldiers rebelled in
order to obtain an increase in salary and an "Africani-
zation" of the officers' corps; their respective govern-
ments asked for aid from the United Kingdom.
In this type of situation, neither doctrine nor
actual state practice leaves any doubt as to the total
discretion of the foreign state to respond to a request
for assistance. In fact, the nature of this aid 3 3 dif-
fers little from that of goods sold to a state in the
context of international commerce.34 It is well estab-
lished that sovereignty encompasses the right to soli-
cit aid from another state and, conversely, to accord
assistance to another state in circumstances such as
these, which do not affect the representative character
of the petitioning government.
32. Professor J.N. Moore refers to "non-authority oriented
internal conflicts." See Moore, The Control of Foreign Interven-
tion in Internal Conflict, 9 Va. J. Int'l L. 209, 259 (1969).
This brings to mind the disturbances of 1978 in Bermuda, which
prompted the local government to call for help from British mili-
tary forces. There are of course numerous other recent examples
of such international military aid.
33. This aid includes the sale of arms and the training pro-
vided for the armed forces of the "assisted" state.
34. Both sorts of transactions are in fact "normal" inter-
actions. To prohibit them would make typical diplomatic relations
impossible, in the same manner as would a prohibition against
presently accepted pressure tactics used by one state in order to
influence a neighboring state. This important point was raised by
representatives of several states during the discussions that pre-
ceded the adoption of Resolution 2131 by the General Assembly in
1965. See G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N.
Doc. A/6014 (1965). This resolution will be discussed in more
detail pp. 195 & 226-28 & n. 79, infra.
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2. Uprisings Aimed at Overthrowing the
Incumbent Government
a) "Mere Rebellions"
From the point of view of the incumbent government,
the rebel forces are invariably common criminals. 3 5 If
the government feels that normal application of the
legal process is insufficient to reestablish order, it
will apply laws of exception.36
The criminal character of the rebels' acts is 9bvi-
ously a question of domestic law. It has no effect on
the position of foreign states, for whom the insurrec-
tion (at this stage) is legally of no importance. The
political drama does not modify the legal status of the
incumbent government, which remains:
... en tout temps, fondg a solliciter un
appui matgriel pour preparer et consolider
ses defenses: ii nlest pas interdit aux
tierces puissances de consentir des prets
au governement lgal, voire de laisser
s 'organiser sur leur territorire des
expeditions militaires en sa faveur.37
Here again doctrine and state practice agree in
treating the "mere rebellion" as an internal affair of
35. "Inciting to Civil War" is often punishable by the death
penalty. In Czarist Russia, the intention alone was punishable
by death, without any proof of actus reus. C. Zorgbibe, La guerre
civile 1 (1975).
36. For example, in Canada, the War Measures Act, Can. Rev.
Stat. c. W-2 (1970), was invoked in Quebec in 1970. The recent
application of "martial law" in South Korea, following the assas-
sination of President Park by a small clique, is a more contem-
porary example of an incumbent government's reaction to small-
scale internal disorders. See The Montreal Gazette, Oct. 27,
1979, at 1.
37. I.e., "... at all times, justified in soliciting mater-
ial support to prepare and to consolidate its defenses; third
powers are not forbidden to authorize loans to the legal govern-
ment, [or] even to allow military expeditions in its [i.e., the
legal government's] favor to be organized on their territory."
C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 59.
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the state in question, having no effect on the relations
between the latter and foreign states.3 8 By acquiring
the status of "belligerents." however, the opponents of
the incumbent regime are endowed with a real, if restric-
ted, legal personality.3 9 This situation transforms the
rights and obligations of foreign states.
b) Belligerency
Again, it is important to note that, until the end
of the eighteenth century, internal conflicts were not
considered to be subject to the general law of war.
A new political context modified the state of law
as early as the American Revolution, when the United
Kingdom, in addition to applying regular criminal law
to the rebels, also adopted a law prohibiting all com-
merce with the American colonies. 40 This initial recog-
nition of belligerency 4 1 was followed rapidly by others,
38. Such an attitude has sometimes been adopted in situa-
tions where the rebellion is not so minor. Thus in September
1967 (three months after the proclamation of the state of Biafra),
the chiefs of state of the member countries of the Organization
for African Unity (OAU) declared that this conflict was "une af-
faire interne du Nigeria dont la responsabilitg relive avant tout
de Za responsabilite des Nigerians eux-mgmes " i.e., "an internal
affair of Nigeria the primary responsibility for which is that of
the Nigerians themselves". See J. Saliton, La reconnaissance
d'etat 161 (1971). This is a case of a refusal to recognize bel-
ligerency. The result of such a refusal is that the insurrection
remains a "mere rebellion" as regards the refusing country. It
also vividly illustrates the present-day relevance of the doctrine
of belligerency as a juridical act.
39. It should be noted that this is not a case of the crea-
tion of a new state nor of a duality in the state representation,
but rather of a temporary "transparency" of the state entity as
regards the outside world. See C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 5.
40. An Act to Prohibit all Trade and Intercourse with the
Colonies During the Continuance of the Present Rebellion, 16 Geo.
3, c.5 (1776) [hereinafter cited as Colonial Trade Prohibition
Act].
41. In The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 694 (1862),
it was admitted that this English law constituted a recognition
of the existence of a state of war between Great Britain and its
American colonies.
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and the doctrine was solidly entrenched by the time the
first treatise on the subject was published in 1865.42
(i) Recognition of Belligerency by
the Incumbent Government
Where the internal conflict has attained a certain
importance the incumbent government may deem it oppor-
tune 3 officially to acknowledge the existence of belli-
gerency between the state it represents and a fraction
of its nationals gathered together on its territory. The
established government can then react toward the insur- 5
gents as if it were at war with them. 4  Rarely explicit,45
this recognition generally consists of a law46 or an act
42. T. Bernis, The Recognition of Rebel Belligerency (1865).
Note that the American War of Independence, by its duration and
importance, helped clarify the state of law in this area.
43. The necessary conditions permitting an incumbent govern-
ment to recognize a state of belligerency have never been codified
(unlike those governing the recognition of belligerency by foreign
states). See p. 221 infra. Bluntschli enumerated three conditions
which would give the rebels the possibility of being recognized by
the incumbent government:
1) They must be organized into a military force;
2) They must respect the laws of war;
3) They must fight in good faith.
J. Bluntschli, Opinion impartiale sur la question de I 'AZabana-c 2
Revue de droit international et de legislation comparee 452, 457
(1870). In spite of this opinion, it must be admitted that this
recognition is purely discretionary, with no necessary conditions.
This author has found no evidence of any authoritative adoption of
Bluntschli' s criteria.
44. This entails, inter alia, the application of the law of
war rather than of the usual criminal law, as well as the unac-
countability of the incumbent government for rebels' acts affect-
ing foreign states. C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 17, 47-50.
The incumbent government also acquires the right to demand that
the insurgents respect the rules of war.
45. At times the recognition is quite explicit: for example,
the acknowledgment by the American Congress on July 4, 1861, of the
existence of a state of war with the Southern Confederation; or,
more recently, Nigeria's declaration of war against Biafra on
August 12, 1967. Before this date, the Nigerian authorities had
limited themselves to police operations.
46. See Colonial Trade Prohibition Act, supra note 40; and
Excise Law, Act of July 13, 1861, Ch. 3, 12 Stat. 255 (1861) (in-
terpreted as being the equivalent of a Declaration of War in The
Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 695 (1862)).
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of war.47 Opinion seems divided,4 8 but it appears that
recognition of belligerency by the incumbent government
is not binding on foreign states, which are free to re-
cognize or to disregard this fiction of the nation-state
entity. In practice, of course, it is obvious that
foreign states must at times submit to measures of war
taken by the incumbent government after such recognition.49
Nonetheless, as the Paul Jones affair5 0 illustrates,
foreign states are legally unaffected by any recognition
of belligerency that they have not themselves recognized.
(ii) Recognition of Belligerency by
Foreign States
The principal element of the "juridical act" doc-
trine, which distinguishes it from the normative system
of the Middle Ages, consists in the possibility for the
insurgents to obtain an international status. This sta-
tus is acquired through the recognition by a foreign
state of the state of belligerency prevailing in the
country torn by internal conflicts. Before such recog-
nition of insurgents as belligerents, the rebellion has
no legal existence in the eyes of foreign states; the
incumbent government is the sole representative of the
state. After such recognition, foreign states have the
obligation of remaining neutral in the internal conflict.
Having itself (through such recognition) attacked the
legitimacy of the incumbent government, a foreign state
can no longer furnish it aid. The juridical act consis-
ting in the recognition of belligerency by a foreign
47. E.g., the blockade imposed by Spain on the ports con-
trolled by the forces of General Franco in 1936; the blockade
ordered by President Lincoln on April 9, 1861 against the Confed-
eration.
48. See generally A. Rougie, Les guerres civiles et le droit
des gens 203 (1903).
49. See J. Westlake, Traite de droit international public 24
(1924).
50. During the American Revolution, a squadron of rebel
forces led by Captain Jones intercepted and boarded three British
commercial vessels, which were then taken to the Danish port of
Bergen. Not having recognized the belligerency of the Americans,
Denmark delivered the vessels to the English and never accepted
the American claim that Denmark was obliged to remain neutral in
the conflict.
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state entails the application of the fourth option out-
lined above: 5 1 obligatory neutrality.
This doctrine of recognition of belligerency by for-
eign states developed slowly -- as did the states them-
selves. The states that invoked it5 2 did not always dis-
tinguish clearly between sanctioning a state of belliger-
ency (i.e,, legally recognizing a condition already
existing in fact) and simply approving the legitimacy of
the insurgents' struggle. For instance, in 1837 the
United States recognized the belligerency of Canadian
rebels, in spite of the fact that they possessed neither
territory nor any solid governmental structures.5 3 A
rather cloudy state of law was somewhat clarified in the
American Civil War when the United States accused the
United Kingdom of having prematurely recognized the bel-
ligerency of the Southern Confederation.54 The conduct
of the parties involved, and the opinions of third par-
ties to this post-Civil War diplomatic crisis, 5 5 reveal-
ed clearly that certain factual conditions had to exist
in order to permit a foreign state's legal recognition
of belligerency, and that premature recognition consti-
tuted illegal intervention prejudicial to the incumbent
51. See p. 179 supra.
52. These were often the more economically and politically
active states who, faced with port blockades, etc., had a great
deal of difficulty in conforming to the fiction of the legal non-
existence of the insurgents. For discussion on the evolution of
this practice, see 2 A. Kiss, Repertoire fran~ais du droit inter-
national public (1966); 1 J. B. Moore, supra note 30; 5 M. Whiteman,
Digest of International Law (1968) [hereinafter cited as 5 Whiteman].
53. Cf. C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 73 (discussing a simi-
lar case).
54. On May 13, 1861, Britain issued a proclamation of neu-
trality in the conflict between the North and South. See 1 J.B.
Moore, supra note 30, at 190. This proclamation was followed by
similar edicts in Spain and France in the month that followed.
55. Reference here is to the Atabana Claims Case. See pp.
19J7-98 infra. For an interesting summary of the evolution of this
conflict, see A. Cook, The Alabama Claims: American Politics and
Anglo-American Relations (1975) [hereinafter cited as Cook]. For
a more purely legal commentary, see Bluntschli, supra note 43; 2




government.5 6 These conditions, which were incorporated
into Section 8 of the Rgglement of the Institute of In-
ternational Law,5 7 consisted of the following:
a: the insurgents must control an
important part of the national
territory;




c: they must engage in combat
through an organized army that
respects the laws and customs
of war.5 8
It should be noted that the first two criteria are
also constitutive elements of the state, Thus, a
"virtual state" must exist in order to permit the "fic-
tion" of sovereignty established by a foreign state's
recognition of belligerency.5 9
It is important to emphasize that such recognition
of insurgents does not endow them with a full legal per-
sonality. Rather, they acquire a "functional personal-
ityi'60 applicable only to the relevant internal conflict.
56. In the Alabama Claims Case, the American claim was
eventually abandoned, as the British recognition was fully justi-
fiable in law. Indeed, Britain acted following gestures by the
American government which amounted to its recognition of the exis-
tence of a state of war. See Cook, supra note 55, at 27. Obvious-
ly, an incumbent government which has recognized the belligerency
of its rebels has no title to dispute a similar act by a foreign
state.
57. See 18 Annuaire institut de droit international 227
(l900).
58. See C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 78 (enumerating many
examples of the application of these criteria).
59. Another school of thought considers non-recognition of
belligerency, once all criteria have been satisfied, as much an
abuse as the refusal to recognize a state. See pp. 20.8 ff. infra.
This school advocates a theory of "belligerency as a state of
facts," and not "belligerency as a juridical act."
60. This expression would appear to be the most appropriate
of the varicus terms used to describe the belligerents' internation-
al legal standing. See E. Castren, supra note 15.
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This personality is necessarily transitory and partial.
The insurgents acquire rights of belligerency toward
foreign states (including, importantly, the right to in-
spect vessels and to enforce maritime blockades); but
they may not develop complete diplomatic ties with other
countries. The legal status of recognized belligerents
is limited by he functional requirements of the con-
flict at hand.
(iii) Belligerency as a Juridical Act
We have just seen that certain factual conditions
must be satisfied to permit a legal recognition of bel-
ligerency by a foreign state. Are these necessary con-
ditions also sufficient in themselves? Does their exis-
tence require recognition of belligerency? In other
words, is belligerency a state of facts or a juridical
act?
During the Alabama conflict, 62 United States Ambas-
sador Fish wrote to his English counterpart Molley on
precisely this point. The American legal position on
the matter, according to Fish, was that:
Each sovereign power must decide, for
itself alone, the question whether it
wished at a given time to bestow rights
of belligerency upon insurgents against
another power. 3
It appears that the bulk of doctrine supports this
position, which denies to insurgents any right to for-
61. Thus, after having declared itself neutral in the Ni-
geria-Biafra conflict, the United Kingdom sent a consular employee
with no diplomatic status to the rebels' capital city.
62. See pp. 197-98 infra.
63. See 1 J.B. Moore, supra note 30, at 192.
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eign state recognition of their belligerency.6 4 This
doctrine is of course justified by the fact that insur-
gents are not de piano subjects of international law.
In this regard, Professor Hall has observed:
As a belligerent community is not
itself a legal person, a society
claiming to be belligerent, and
not to have permanently established
its independence, can have'no
rights under that law. It cannot
therefore demand to be recognized
and recognition... is from the
legal point of view a concession
of pure grace.
6 5
Thus, belligerency as a juridical act turns on the
access of foreign states to factual data on the rebel-
lion. Indeed, the doctrine seems to be fundamentally
corollary to the principles of state sovereignty and of
the indivisibility of state representation. 6
64. See E. Castren, supra note 15, at 110; Wehberg. L'inter-
diction du recours a la force: le principe et les problemes qui
se posent, 78 Recueil des cours 74 (1951); Scelle, La guerre
civile espagnole et le droit dea gensj Revue generale de droit
international public, N.S. 272 (1938); McNair, supra note 29; 7,
Hall, International Law 34 (8th ed. 1924) Thereinafter cited as
Hall]; Balladore-Paglieri, Queiques aspects juridiques de la non-
intervention en Espagne-, Revue de droit international et de
lgislation comparge 287 (1937).
65. See Hall, supra note 64, at 39.
66. See text accompanying note 16 supra. One of the effects
of foreign state recognition of belligerency is the abandonment by
the "recognizing-state" of its right to claim from the "victim-
state" compensation for the losses suffered by its nationals as a
result of the hostilities. See The Three Friends 166 D.S. 63
(1896). It is apparent that, even though the recognition of bel-
ligerency does not sanction the creation of a new state, it does
in effect make the state in conflict "transparent" with respect to
the recognizing state. Indeed, such recognition is a means of at-
tributing to a non-state entity the status of subject of interna-
tional law. It is precisely this non-state status of the insur-
gents (who would have remained nationals of a state whose govern-
ment had not lost all effective power, had it not been for this
recognition) which explains the inevitably optional nature of this
recognition.
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It is perhaps useful to point out some of the im-
plications of this doctrine. For one, the foreign state
may recognize the belligerents as soon as certain
factual conditions exist. Following such recognition,
the foreign state will no longer have the right of of-
fering assistance to the incumbent government. It is,
however, equally possible for foreign states not to
recognize the belligerents, since belligerency is a
purely juridical act rather than the inevitable conse-
quence of a state of facts. In that case, the foreign
state remains free to help the threatened government.
Finally, nothing prevents a foreign state which has
recognized belligerency from withdrawing this recogni-
tion (to which the insurgents have no right), for rea-
sons of political strategy, or simply in order to con-
firm the evolution of the conflict.6 7 Clearly, the
doctrine of "belligerency as a juridical act" permits
foreign states, which remain free to modify the legal
status of the belligerents, to assist the incumbent
government, or to refuse assistance, as they desire.
iv) The "Raglement" of the Institute of
International Law 6 8
In treating insurrectional movements, the R~glement
de Neuchate1, adopted by the Institute of International
Law, endorses in both letter and spirit the doctrine of
"belligerency as a juridical act." The Reglement sets
forth no prohibition against assisting the incumbent
government. On the contrary, Section 2(1) prohibits
the impeding of measures taken by the incumbent govern-
ment in order to reestablish its "internal stability."
Six of the nine sections of the Reglement are aimed at
the "attribution of the titl9 of 'belligerents' to the
insurgents," and it is clear0 9 that aid may be given to
67, Thus, in August 1967, the United Kingdom reconsidered
its previous status of neutrality in the Nigeria-Biafra War and
decided to withdraw its recognition of Biafra and to supply arms
to the central government.
68. See Appendix 1, supra note 57.
69. But see Id. §§ 6 & 7.
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the incumbent government,70 until the optional recogni-
tion of belligerency.
c) Postscript: The Hazy "State of Insurgency"
This concept, at one time found in the writings of
American jurists and used by the United States Depart-
ment of State, 7 1 has been well described as constitu-
ting a "twilight zone between rebellion and belliger-
ency. "72 According to some authors, 7 3 the "state of
insurgency" entails a special set of rules applicable
to maritime hostilities. The preponderance of author-
ity, however, suggests that the recognition of a state
of insurgency by a foreign state signifies its admis-
sion of the existence of a "civil war," without acknow-
ledgement of the legal effects of this recognition
under the "belligerency" doctrine. These foreign states
would consequently be legally free to define their rela-
tions with the incumbent government. The recognition
of a "state of insurgency" is thus more a function of
factual than legal considerations. Its legal conse-
quences have indeed been characterized as "fioues,
voires indefinies."74 This doctrine was invoked princi-
70. The rapporteur, A. Desjardins, claims that "on sape
l'independence des Etats en paralysant les efforts qu'ils peuvent
faire pour r~primer une r'volte", i.e., "[T]he independence of
States is undermined by paralyzing the efforts which they can make
to repress a revolt." Id. at 76.
71. See, e.g., Wilson, Insurgency and International Mari-
time Law, 1 Am. J. Int'l L. 46 (1907); The Three Friends, 166 U.S.
63, 65-66 (1896).
72. Farer, Foreign Intervention in Civil Armed Conflict, 142
Recueil des cours 318 (1974).
73. See Wilson, supra note 71; R. Oglesby, supra note 6, at
113.
74. I.e., "hazy, indeed undefined". Veuthey, Les conflits
arm~s d'un caractire non-international, in Current Problems of In-
ternational Law 208 (A. Cassesse ed. 1975). See also Falk, supra
note 27, at 199.
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pally during the Spanish Civil War, 7 5 and has never
really been clarified, so that its present-day useful-
ness is rather doubtful.76
C. Aid to the Opponents of the Incumbent Government
During an internal conflict, the incumbent govern-
ment is confronted by insurgents who aspire to replace
it in at least part of the national territory. The
rebels' goals naturally lead them to seek support abroad.
Indeed, foreign states represent not only potential mili-
tary allies for the insurgents, but also the possibility
of international legitimization of the rebel "govern-
ment."
75. International recognition of this conflict, through the
declaration of non-intervention, was not accompanied by express
recognition of "belligerency." The British position throughout
this rebellion clearly illustrates the confusion that surrounds
this "half-way" concept. Indeed, the United Kingdom refused to
confer rights of belligerency on the Nationalist rebels, but none-
theless recognized the state of insurgency. This recognition of
a purely factual situation induced the British courts to accord to
the "insurgent" government rights similar to those granted regular
governmental entities. The "transparency" of the Spanish state be-
came juridically complete, so that in practice the British recogni-
tion of "insurgency" differed little from a granting of "belliger-
ent" status. Cf. Banco de Bilbao v. Rey, [1938] 2 K.B. 176. (Bri-
tish refusal to recognize as valid decrees of the de jure Republican
government with regard to a bank within the de facto control of the
Narionalist rebels); In re: The Arantzazu Mendi [193911 All E.R. 719.
(British refusal to implead the de facto Nationalist government in a
libel case on the grounds that the Nationalists were protected by
sovereign immunity.)
76. In 1947, Sir H. Lauterpacht insisted that:
Actually, international law knows of no trecogni-
ion of insurgency' as an act conferring upon in-
surgents international rights following from a
well defined status. That insurgency has been
recognized in any given case means that specific
rights have been created . . . . It does not
create a status from which further and more
general rights may be deduced.
Recognition in International Law 274 (1947).
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Principles of national unity and of territorial in-
tegrity, when applied to the state in conflict, are,
however, incompatible with foreign state aid to the in-
surgents. These legal principles are, of course,
shared by all states. Indeed, they possess an incom-
parable persuasive force for those younger states
created during the process of decolonization and
anxious to affirm their national character. It was in
this legal context that the norms governing foreign
states' relations with insurgent forces were developed.
1. Fomenting the Internal Conflict
It is unlawful7 7 to provoke an armed conflict on
the territory of another state. This prohibition de-
rives from the principle of state sovereignty and from
its corollary which forbids intervention by one country
in the internal affairs of another.
This basic princi le is of course reiterated both
in doctrinal sources 7  and in the numerous treaties and
declarations emanating from international bodies. It
is not necessary to elaborate on this point other than
77. The term "unlawful" would appear to be the appropriate
one. In any case it has become a suitable term since 1945, when
article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter came into effect and prohibited
recourse to inter-state war. Obviously, a foreign state's fomen-
ting a conflict is a clear casus belli. See, e.g., Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty,
G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention].
78. For a list of references, see I D. O'Connell, The Inter-
national Law 238 (1965).
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by enumerating some of these sources. 7 9
2. Help to Opponents After the Outbreak of
Internal Conflict
a) During a "Mere Rebellion"
We have seen that insurgents have no international
legal status during the stage of "mere rebellion."
Again, this situation is corollary to principles of
state sovereignty and independence. All assistance
given to the rebels by foreign states during this period
would thus constitute an illegal intervention. This
principle, affirmed explicitly in the settlement of the
79. Section four of the Draft Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. Res. 375, 4 U.N, GAOR, Supp. (No. 10)
49, U.N. Doc. A/1196 (1949) states that "Every State must abstain
from fomenting civil war on the territory of another State and must
prevent all actions on its own territory aimed at fomenting such a
civil war," The resolution on "Peace Through Deeds, G.A. Res. 380,
5 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 20) 13, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950), declares
that fomentation of internal conflicts by foreign states is kthe
most serious crime against world peace and security." The Draft
Code of Crimes against World Peace and Security, adopted by the
United Nations Commission of International Law, see Whiteman, supra
note 52, at 861, sets forth the same idea. See also Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 77; Declaration of
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970), The charters of several internatiQnal
organizations sanction the principles of territorial integrity and
political independence of all states. See U.N. Charter art. 2,
para 4; Organization for African Unity Charter art. 2, para. 1(c);
Organization of American States arts. 1; 5, para. 5; 9 & 15.
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Caroline affair, 8 0 has been confirmed in more modern
practice. 1 One might wonder, however, if the Caroline
rule applies even when the insurgents have acquired the
status of "belligerents."
b) During Belligerency
Several authors assert that belligerents may legal-
ly receive foreign assistance. 82 This opinion is, how-
ever, far from generally accepted.
Thus, Section 2(2) of the Reglement of the Insti-
tute of International Law confirmed in explicit terms
the illegalJty of aid to belligerents. This position
has been pheld both in multilateral agreements8 3 and by
case-law.° 4  The classic case in this respect is, of
course, the Alabama affair. During the Civil War, the
Confederacy (whose ports were quite effectively block-
aded by Union forces) ordered and took delivery of
80. During the night of December 29, 1837, British soldiers
crossed the Canadian-American boundary in order to destroy the
steam ship Caroline, which had been used to aid the rebels of
Upper Canada. The exchange of letters which ensued between U.S.
Secretary of State Webster and Lord Ashburton attests to the il-
legal character of the American assistance to the Canadian insur-
gents.
81. In Strait of Corfu, [1949] I.C.J. 3, the International
Court admitted, inter alia, that the customary rule illustrated in
the Caroline case was still in effect in contemporary international
law.
82. Falk, International Law and the U.S. Role in Vietnam, in
1 The Vietnam War and International Law 48 (R, Falk ed. 1968); Pin-
to, supra note 10, at 478.
83. See, e.g., Covenant of the Arab League art. 8; Charter
of the Organization of American States art. 15; Interamerican Con-
vention of 1928 ("Havana Agreement") art. 1 (concerning the rights
and duties of States during civil wars); and the 1957 Protocol to
the Havana Agreement art. V.
84. See The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1896).
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several warships in England. 85 This fleet of ships
literally devastated the Union Navy. When hostilities
had ceased, the Americans complained about this "aid to
the insurgents." The Treaty of Washington of 871, and
the arbitration award of 1872 which followed,80 clearly
affirmed the illegality of aid to rebel forces, even
when these forces had been granted "belligerent" status
by the foreign state in question.8 7
Aid provided by foreign8 tates to rebel forces
would thus be, in all cases: °
patently incompatible with the
very foundation of international
law, which is built on the sover-
eignty of States and their right
to determine the form of their
regime. 89
85. The Alabama, Alexandra, Florida, Georgia and Shenandoah.
Not only were these ships built in England, but they were also
anchored in British ports on many occasions. Note that Great Brit-
ain had recognized the belligerency of the South.
86. The arbitration court of Geneva ordered Great Britain
to pay the United States $15,000 as compensation for damages.
87. As early as 1863, Lord Palmerston had justified the Bri-
tish position maintaining that there was no legal government in the
United States, but rather two belligerent governments. See Cook,
supra note 55, at 18. This interpretation was clearly rejected by
the Treaty of Washington and the arbitration award of Geneva, in
which the distinction between the incumbent government (repository
of state sovereignty) and the not-yet-victorious insurgents was
made.
88. I.e., whether or not the phase of "belligerency" was re-
placed by that of "mere rebellion."
89. Friedman, Intervention and International Law, in Inter-
vention in International Politics 47 (L. Jacquet ed, 1971). For a
more vigorous elaboration of this opinion, see Rostow, Book Review,
82 Yale L.J. 829 (1972).
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D. "Belligerency as a Juridical Act": Justification
and Critique of the Theory
1. Justification of the Theory
Professor Friedmann's concise statement of the
theory is a crucial one. To cite principles of state
sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and
non-intervention is an indirect way of justifying the
"belligerency as a juridical act" doctrine by referring
to the rights of citizens organized in states to "self-
determination,"90
These principles are undoubtedly part of--even in-
herent in--contemporary international law. It would
perhaps not be going too far to say, with Friedmann,
that these principles are the "very foundation" of in-
ternational law. Indeed, they seem to have been made
entrenched by paragraphs (1), (4), and (7) of Article 2
of the U.N. Charter.
Thus, in its Strait of Corfu judgment, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice emphasized that "between inde-
pendent states, respect of territorial sovereignty is
one of the foundations of international relations."9l
One year later the Court decided that Colombia
could not legally grant asylum, in its Lima embassy, to
a dissident Peruvian leader; such a gesture constituted,
for the Court, a breach of Peru's sovereignty, and "an
intervention in matters which are exclusively within the
competence of that State." 9 2
Each state, represented by its government, is thus
protected by principles forbidding "the threat or use of
force"'9 3 against its territorial integrity and constrain-
ing other states from intervening in its domestic affairs.
90. See J.-F. Guilhaudis, Le droit des peuples a disposer
d'eux-memes 109-34 and 201-09 (1976). It is useful to contrast
this right of states with the conceptually (and legally) indepen-
dent notion of self-determination for "peoples" not constituting
a state.
91. [1949] I.C.J. 35.
92. Asylum Case [1950] I.C.J. at 275.
93. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
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These norms have been reiterated so many times by inter-
national bodies9 4 that their force cannot seriously be
questioned. As the incumbent government is the only
legal representative of the state, it enjoys the two
prerogatives par excellence of state sovereignty: (1)
the possibility of asking for assistance from another
state and, (2) the ability to grant aid to another
state.9 5 Only the representative of the state can le-
gally solicit outside help. Accordingly, foreign
states may not respond to requests for assistance on
the part of the internal enemies of this representative.
Finally, since the foreign state has its own sovereign
discretion to grant help to a foreign government, it is
therefore free to adopt a "hands-off" policy. Professor
Leurdijk emphasizes:
The preferential treatment of the ruling
faction that resulted from this system
was not based on any political or ide-
ological sympathy, but was attributable
solely to the fact that it is, after all,
through their governments that states
participate in international relations.9 6
2. Critique
The components of the normative system that we have
been describing might be summarized as follows: (1.) an
unequivocal prohibition against assisting insurgents
(until their total victory); (2) the option of provi-
ding the incumbent government with aid at all times be-
fore a "belligerency" status has been attained; (3) the
94. The following list is not exhaustive: Charter of the
Organization for African Unity, preamble, arts. 2, 3, 5; Covenant
of the Arab League, preamble, arts. 2, 5, 8; Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States, arts. 1, 2, 15, 16, 17, 18; San Salvador
Charter (Central American Union), art. 3; North Atlantic Treaty,
art. 1; South-East Asia Collective Defense Treaty, preamble, art.
1; Warsaw Pact, preamble, arts. 1, 8.
95. See Fitzmaurice, General Principles of International Law,
92 Recueil des cours 5, at 177 (1957).
96. Leurdijk, Civil War and Intervention in International
Law, Essays on International Law and Relations in Honour of A.J.P.
Tammes 146 (J. Leurdijk ed. 1977).
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power that each state has to determine whether a state
of belligerency exists in another state. We shall now
examine some of the drawbacks of this normative system.
a) Drawbacks of the Theory in a Decentralized
Global Power Structure
Actually, foreign states are rather
free, given limitation of capability,
to determine their own relations
with insurgent and incumbent. 97
This statement hardly appears to be compatible with
the doctrine of "belligerency as a juridical act," which
prohibits all aid to insurgents while generally allow-
ing such aid if it is destined for the incumbent governz
ment. Falk's affirmation, however, was less a state-
ment of the theory of this normative system than an at-
tempt to describe its actual functioning. This gap be-
tween theory and practice is largely a product of the
political decentralization of contemporary internation-
al society.
Foreign states are in fact free to recognize or to
ignore the existence of objective facts that might con-
stitute a state of belligerency. The implications of
this discretion are clear. For instance, the incumbent
government has considerable advantages if it can pre-
vent the state of "belligerency" from being recognized.98
Cuban aid to the Ethiopian government during the Eri-
trean conflict was therefore licit, in spite of the con-
trol exercised by the rebel forces in Eritrea (where
they had taken over most governmental functions), simply
97. Falk, supra, note 27, at 201.
98. The annoyance of the United States following the recog-
nition of a "state of belligerency" by the Europeans during the
Civil War is thus quite understandable. The Americans even refer-
red to the "immoral" character of the Confederate regime in their
attempt to prevent such recognition; see Cook, supra note 55, at
99. Senator Sumner's grasp of the politicization of this legal
concept was illustrated by his complaint, "How can it be neutral
to create rights that somehow become binding afterwards?" quoted
in C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 74.
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because Cuba chose not to recognize this state of af-
fairs. 9 9 A conceptually clear legal doctrine has thus
become significantly distorted because of its political
consequences. 100
Even if aid to the incumbent government is clearly
legal,101 though, it is still necessary to determine
which government is "incumbent." In some cases, where
there are several competing governments, and no legal
repository of sovereignty, assistance to the "incumbent
government" thus becomes the result of a strategic
choice.1 0 2 At times, invocation of the principle of
"aid to the incumbent government" lacks credibility.1 0 3
99. This case is submitted only as an example. We are there-
fore intentionally silent as to the subject of the foreign aid that
the Eritrean secessionists may have received, and which could legi-
timize the Cuban assistance according to the doctrine of collective
self-defense.
100. "Political objectives distort the connection between the
status of insurgency and the existence of the facts warranting it;
such a distortion is often disguised, however, by the decentralized
grant of competence that authorizes the third state to characterize
an internal war and to proceed as it sees fit." Falk, supra note
27, at 202.
101. It is not even necessary, in our opinion, to invoke Uni-
ted Nations Charter art. 51 to legitimize such aid, for, if the
internal conflict has not been fomented by a foreign state, no arm-
ed aggression exists. Art. 2, para. 4, and art 51 do not apply to
what would thus amount to mere exercises of state sovereignty.
102. The Angolan civil war provided a rather clear example
of this point. It is possible to invoke the Korean and Vietnamese
wars in the same light. This author, however, is of the opinion
that the epithet, "internal conflicts", is not really applicable to
those two situations.
103. This was true of the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in
July, 1958. Its legality is clear, despite the fact that, as the
State Department admitted, the "Lebanese government" controlled
only a minute part of the national territory. See Wright, United
States Intervention in Lebanon, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 112 (1959). This
particular case of aid can be justified by the principle of the in-
divisibility of state sovereignty, i.e., the repository of sover-
eignty does not change until the incumbent government is totally
deprived of de facto authority. See C. Zorgbibe, supra note 55, at
132. The French intervention in Gabon, aimed at restoring to power
the clique that had been overthrown the day before, is more problem-
atic. See Schindler, Le principe de non-intervention dans les
guerres civiles, 55 Annuaire de l'institut de droit international
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Justifications given by interventionist states certainly
seem to confirm the continued acceptance by the interna-
tional community of the principle of aid to the incum-
bent government. The power of the individual state to
recognize such a government, however, makes any stand-
ardization of criteria for clearly identifying viola-
tions of this principle difficult.
b) Recognition of Belligerency: An Outmoded
Concept?104
We have seen that the recognition of rebel belliger-
ency by foreign states is an essential component of the
"belligerency as a Juridical act" doctrine. Although it
is not absolutely correct to assert, as some do, that
"such a doctrine has not been applied for several deca-
des,"1 05 it is nonetheless true that the tendency among
states is to avoid all express recognitions. This makes
the legal evaluation of state claims extremely diffi-
cult. For example, did the "non-intervention agreement"
signed by 27 states during the Spanish Civil War consti-
tute a modification of the principle of "aid to the in-
103. (Continued)
454 (1973). The more extreme cases are those of Hungary (where the
Soviet intervention of 1956 was ratified by the government that it
brought to power) and the Dominican Republic (where Mr. Stevenson
invoked "the call of the legal government" before the Security
Council, even though none of the factions involved in the struggle
was, at the relevant times, recognized by the American government).
104. See R. Oglesby, supra note 6, at 100-111.
105. Leurdijk, supra note 96, at 148. In fact, the United
States and the United Kingdom declared themselves neutral in the
Nigerian conflict on July 11, 1967 (Le Monde, July 12, 1967), and
there is no reason why these declarations should not be considered
express recognitions of belligerency. (We have already seen that
this recognition was later revoked by the United Kingdom.) More-
over, the reality of the concept of recognition of belligerency is
illustrated by its mention in the 1957 Protocol to the Havana
Agreement.
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cumbent government, "1l0 6 as many contend, or was it
rather proof of an implicit recognition of General Fran-
co as a "belligerent"?1 0 7
Foreign states, therefore, rarely perform the expli-
cit juridical act of recognizing a state of belliger-
ency.108 Verifying contemporary compliance with the
traditional doctrine is difficult. One author goes so
far as to say:
The functional role attributed to
the distinctions between rebellion,
insurgency and belligerency is more
an invention of commentators than a
description of state behavior.109
c) Other Critiques
It is worthwhile briefly to discuss some other prob-
lems relating to the traditional doctrine.
First, it is somewhat difficult to reconcile the
necessary criteria for allowing a recognition of belli-
gerencyll0 with "modern" methods of combat (notably,
106. See Declaration of the Spanish government, League of
Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. 155, at 49 (1936). With respect to the
agreement in general, see Padelford, The International Non-Inter-
vention Agreement and the Spanish Civil War, Am. J. Int'l L. 578
(1937).
107. Balladore-Paglieri, supra note 64, at 29.1. See also
Scelle and Cassin, Le blocus de Bilbao et le droit des gens,
L'Europe nouvelle, 437 (1937). Note that a third interpretation of
this agreement is that it does not at all modify legal doctrine be-
cause foreign states are not obliged to offer help to the estab-
lished government. Nothing prevents a foreign state from foregoing
its right to aid an incumbent government. Thus, a self-imposed
neutrality would have no effect whatsoever on the traditional legal
norm. See Rousseau, La non-intervention en Espagne, 19 Recueil des
cours 225 (1938).
108. See C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 73, 77-78; Pinto,
supra note 10, at 475, for other examples of express recognition of
belligerency.
109. Falk, supra note 27, at 206.
110. See Appendix 1, supra note 57, art. 8.
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guerilla warfare).1 1 1
In addition, it may seem inappropriate to apply the
doctrine of "aid to the incumbent government" in cases
where state sovereignty is divided: i.e., where each
opposing "government" is to some extent "incumbent."
Conflicts between a government-member of a federation
and the federal government illustrate this case -- both
governments could claim to exercise sovereign powers on
the "litigious territory."1 1 2 This question, of course,
deserves thorough study. Within the framework of the
present study, however, we can only suggest the hypothe-
sis that aid granted to the government-member by a for-
eign state would not be tainted with the same illegality
as that accorded to "mere" insurgents, especially if the
government-member had the constitutional power to soli-
cit such aid.
Finally, some authors have expressed the opinion
that, because the traditional rule permitting aid to the
incumbent government is no longer respected by Communist
-bloc states, the continuing respect accorded it by non-
Communist states has thus become "dysfunctional. '"l3
Without delving into the important strategic problem
that is involved here, we might indicate that "lapses"
have occurred on both sides of the ideological fence.11 4
111. C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 191. See also Meyerowitz,
Le statut des gugrilleros dans le droit international, Journal du
droit international 875 (1973).
112. This problem is raised by Professor O'Connell, Annex, 55
Annuaire de l'institut de droit international 589 (1973). For an
analysis of this problem focusing on Quebec, see J. Brossard,
L'Accession la souverainete et le cas du Quebec 94 (1976).
113. See Halpern, The Morality and Politics of Intervention,
in International Aspects of Civil Strife, supra note 27, at 249-288.
We cannot resist comparing this viewpoint with the "rule of second
best" in American antitrust law. For an interesting analysis of
this subject, see F. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Eco-
nomic Performance 22-27 (1975).
114. Note the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces
of the Warsaw Pact in 1978. Having failed in his initial attempts
to justify this invasion as a reply to a supposed invitation by the
incumbent Czech regime, Leonid Brezhnev resorted to the surprising
claim that it was legitimate for the Soviet Union to intervene
within its "sphere of influence" in order to do away with any gov-
ernments having pro-Western tendencies, The Brezhnev doctrine
might be compared with the statement made on May 2nd, 1965, by
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Moreover, the existence of such "lapses" does not con-
clusively prove (.either in international or national
law) the obsolescence of such a norm. When one refers
to legal claims made by states in thesell5 and in otherll
6
circumstances, one realizes that the traditional norm is
still upheld by the international community.
It should be mentioned that the drawbacks of the
doctrine of "belligerency as a juridical act" do not
pertain to the existence of the norm in contemporary law
as much as to its continued usefulness in a heterogene-
ous global community. Thus, the recent rarefaction of
foreign state recognitions of belligerency does not af-
fect the principal rules of the international legal sys-
tem, i.e., the prohibition against aiding insurgents, on
the one hand, and the option of assisting the incumbent
government, on the other.
It is, of course, true that competing legal formulae
have been advanced to regulate the behavior of foreign
states during an internal conflict. Unlike the "belli-
gerency as a juridical act" doctrine, which confers im-
portant advantages upon the incumbent government, the
two competing theories that we shall examine below in-
volve a symmetric treatment by foreign states of both
parties to hostilities. One of these theories, "belli-
gerency as a state of facts," would result in the isola-
tion of the internal conflict; the other, "belligerency
as war," would entail its instant internationalization.
114. (Continued)
President Johnson to the effect that the United States would no
longer tolerate pro-Communist revolutions in the Western hemisphere.
Friedmann, supra note 89, at 47, asserts that both of these state-
ments are strategic maneuvers rather than legal claims.
115. See note 97 supra.
116. In the Nigerian conflict, which did not involve any pol-
icy of "spheres of influence," both ideological blocs provided
assistance to the incumbent government. More recently, the United
States refused ZegaZly to condemn aid to the Ethiopian government.
See note 17 supra; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
During the Spanish Civil War, League of Nations delegates admitted
openly that aid to the incumbent government did not violate the
Covenant, i.e., that such aid did not constitute illegal interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of the conflict-torn state. Cf. 18
League of Nations O.J. 16 (1937) (Soviet declaration condemning as-
sistance to the rebels); id. at 18 (relevant resolution).
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II. Belligerency as a State of Facts: The Principle
of Judicial Isolation of the Internal Conflict
It is interesting to Montrast the passage introduc-
ing the previous sectionl l ? with the one below, articu-
lated in the context of the same "civil war":
So far from there being any active
duty to assist a governmerrt in sup-
pressing an insurrection, there is...
the view that the governments of
other states ought to abstain from
any such action on the ground that it
is an intervention in the domestic
affairs of another state.1l8
The "view" to which Professor McNair referred
favors the fourth of the a priori possibilities enumera-
ted earlier: obligatory neutrality.ll9 Under its pre-
cepts, foreign states would be prohibited from assisting
parties to an internal conflict. Before examining this
position in detail, we might note that it shares several
elements with the doctrine permitting aid to the incum-
bent government. It is only with regard to this aid
that there is a substantial controversy.
A. The Uncontested Aspects of the Controversy
Let us stress what should at this point be evident:
no norm of customary or written international law pro-
hibits recourse to armed force to alter the political
status of a state from within that state. 1 2 0 Interna-
tional law does not forbid internal revolution, and it
117. See text accompanying note 23, supra.
118. McNair, supra note 29, at 474.
119. See p. 179 supra.
120. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7, provides that: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state or shall require the Members to submit such mat-
ters to settlement under the present Charter." Contra, id. art. 4,
para. 2. In fact, violent internal changes occur often and, gener-
ally, without the involvement of foreign states. See Rostow, supra
note 89, at 843.
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encourages internal social progress.1 2 1 What it does not
countenancel2 2 is the international use of force in re-
lations between states.
The doctrine to which Professor McNair was refer-
ring agrees with the "belligerency as a juridical act"
thesis on two essential points: (l) the option for for-
eign states to assist the incumbent government in deal-
ing with minor agitation1 2 3 and,(2) the absolute prohi-
bition against aiding insurgents. 1 2 4 It is on the deter-
mination of the moment at which aid to the incumbent
government is no longer licit that the controversy cen-
ters. The theory of "belligerency as a state of facts"
prescribes, in effect, a passive attitude on the part of
foreign states in all cases of real uprising. This
doctrine has a respectable intellectual legacy and, at
first glance, several theoretical advantages. Its prin-
cipal drawbacks, we submit, are that it hardly corres-
ponds to actual state practice, and that it ignores what
is perhaps the most basic principle of contemporary in-
ternational law, a principle which, paradoxically, this
doctrine was designed to respect.
B. The Controversial Point: The Theory and its
Advantages
1. The Theory
The view that international law prohibits aid to
the incumbent government during all genuine uprisings is
not a new one. The opinion was shared by a number of
scholars toward the end of the nineteenth centuryl 25
and has subsequently been voiced by several contemporary
121. See U.N. Charter preamble, arts. 1 & 2.
122. Id., art. 2, para. 4.
123. See p. 183 supra.
124, See p. 195 supra.
125. See Bluntschli, Le droit international codifie 476
(1886); 1 P. Pradier-Fodere, Droit international public europeen et
anericain 584 (1885); Rougier, supra note 48, at 362.
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authors.12 6 Some even maintain that it constitutes the
prevailing doctrinal view.1 2 7
This theory does not question the right to assist
the incumbent government during disorders that do not
threaten its legitimacy or its existence (e.g., after
earthquakes). The situation is different, however, in
the case of revolutions.1 28 According to several of the
proponents of this theory, it is unlawful to assist a
government that is unable, alone, to suppress the rebel-
lion. Hence, the oft-quoted opinion of Professor Hall:
The fact that it has been necessary
to call in foreign help is enough to
show that the issue of the conflict
without it is uncertain, and conse-
quently, that there is a doubt as to
which side would ultimately establish
itself as the legal representative
of the state.1 2 9
For others, it is the legitimacy of the established
government, rather than its viability, that is undermin-
ed by its request for help. It follows that foreign aid
to the incumbents would be illegitimate, as it would
change the "natural" outcome of the conflict. 1 3 0 As
early as 1898, Professor Wiesse wrote:
126. See, e.g., Brownlie, supra note 11, at 322; Hall, supra
note 64, at 346; Lauterpacht, Contemporary Practice in the United
Kingdom in the Field of International Law--Survey and Comment, 7
Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 92, 102-105 (1957); Wehberg, La guerre civile et
le droit international, 63 Recueil des cours 56 (1938); Wright,
supra note 103.
127. See C. Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 55.
128. For an outline of the "traditional" view regarding aid
to an incumbent government during revolts, see pp. 184-85 supra. Note
that it is precisely the more serious internal troubles that induce
incumbent governments to ask for outside help. Thus one might sus-
pect that, despite theoretical distinctions, supporters of this
view would have a tendency to look with suspicion upon most re-
quests for aid. For an illustration of this circular logic, see
Hall, supra note 64, at 347.
129. Id.
130. For discussion of the impact foreign aid has on the
principle of self-determination, see p. 220 infra.
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All interventions during civil wars
represent a denial of the right of
peoples to conduct their affairs with
full independence. The fact that the
intervention has been solicited by one
of the parties to the conflict is of
no consequence, even if that party is
the incumbent government. 1 3 1
We have here, in fact, two slightly different ex-
pressions of one basic opinion, an opinion which rejects
the claim that rebel belligerency (and the legal obliga-
tion of foreign state neutrality that accompanies it)
must be recognized by foreign states in order to take ef-
fect. We have seen that such recognition is one of ex-
pediency, that is, constitutive of rights for the rebels.
Rejection of this claim would transform any such recogni-
tion into a declarative act. In other words, this doc-
trine transforms belligerency (and its legal effects)
from a juridical act to a state of facts. This point is
implicit in Professor Fitzmaurice's claim that:
[Tihere may come a point when the
giving or continuance of assistance
or support to the legitimate govern-
ment, at any rate in active form,
may cease to be justified, or alterna-
tively constitute a failure to recog-
nize a state of belligerency for the
insurgent authority, where such recog-
nition is clearly due.13 2
131. C. Wiesse, Le droit international applique aux guerres
civiles 86 (1896) (emphasis supplied). The original French text
reads:
Toute intervention dans une guerre civile
constitue une atteinte au droit des
peuples de regler eux-memes leurs propres
affaires avec une entigre independance.
Le fait qui l'une des parties sollicite
lintervention n'est nullement de nature
a la rendre legitime, alors meme que la
demande emanerait du gouvernement etabli.
132. Fitzmaurice, supra note 95, at 172 (emphasis supplied).
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A parallel might be drawn between this reasoning
and the doctrine of state recognition.13 3 Such recogni-
tion is said, by what is probably the dominant opinion
in this field, to have merely a declaratory effect. Ac-
cording to Professor Brierly:
A state may exist without being
recognized, and if it does exist
in fact then, whether or not it
has been formally recognized by other
states, it has the right to be trea-
ted by them as a state.134
It is tempting to conclude that the recognition of bel-
ligerency must have the same sort of effect.
It is also possible to support this doctrine by
analogy with the legal evolution of the concept of dec-
laration of war.1 3 5 Such declarations have lost much of
their practical importance. Indeed, rules governing
violent conflicts between states now apply largely to
factual situations rather than only to "declared" wars.
1 36
A reasonable conclusion, then, is that objective crite-
ria have replaced optional declarations in other areas
of international law as well.1 3 7
133. See Brossard, supra note 112, at 400 (additional sour-
ces listed therein).
134. J. Brierly, The Law of Nations 139 (6th ed. 1963). The
history of the state of Israel has, of course, contributed to the
evolution of law in this area. Cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 126, at
175 ("The basic principle governing the recognition of States and
governments applies also to recognition of belligerency . . . The
essence of that principle is that recognition is not in the nature
of a grant or a favour . . but a duty imposed by the facts of a
situation.").
135. See Schindler, supra note 103, at 441.
136. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions of 1949, ch. I, art. 2,
No. 970, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 32 (stipulating that the conventions apply
in "cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties . . . ").
137. One should note, however, the weaknesses of these anal-
ogies. Indeed, since war has been eliminated as a legal means of
settling interstate conflicts, see U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4, a
formal declaration of war is no longer of any interest to a belli-
cose state. Application of these rules to "undeclared wars" is
thus necessary to accomplish the humanitarian goals established in
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Internal conflicts, however, raise
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2. The Advantages of the Theory
a) The Apparent Advantages
As has been indicated, the doctrine of "belliger-
ency as a state of facts" has several attractive fea-
tures.
First, it is immediately evident that this theory
appears to remedy the disadvantages arising from the
subjectivity of the "belligerency as a juridical act"
doctrine.1 3b Instead of waiting for discretionary --
and increasingly rare -- recognition before impressing
neutrality on foreign states, such neutrality comes into
force as soon as "objective factual conditions" exist.
Second, this theory can be seen as a safeguard of
the independence of states. Indeed, many feel that pro-
hibiting aid to either party to any internal hostilities
is an excellent means of respecting the sovereignty of
the state in confict. Wright, for example, asserts
137. (Continued)
a different problem. There is no international norm prohibiting a
formal "civil war" with a declaration of belligerency; in fact,
such a formal declaration was explicitly provided for in an inter-
national document as recently as 1957 and was applied in 1967.
See note 105 supra. The reasons for transforming a "juridical act"
into a "state of facts" when dealing with international war are ir-
relevant when dealing with internal conflicts. Regarding the argu-
ment derived from the "recognition of states" doctrine, one might
note that the concept of "belligerency" arises precisely in those
situations where a collectivity does not constitute a state. See
W. Bishop, International Law 393 (3rd ed. 1971). Consequently,
while the existing-but-not-yet-recognized state is a subject of in-
ternational law, insurgents do not benefit from such status. Thus
one may justifiably object to the transposing of the declaratory
effect of recognition from instances of international war to cases
of internal conflict.




It clearly belongs to the sovereignty
of a state, as recognized by the
Charter, to ask for such help but it
must be emphasized that sovereignty
belongs to the state, and not to the
government, and a government beset by
internal revolt of such magnitude that
the result is uncertain is not in a
position to speak for the state.139
Finally, some authors maintain that the isolation
of the internal conflict which would result from the
"belligerency as a state of facts" doctrine satisfies
the principle of self-determination of peoples, who are
accordingly able to choose their form of government with-
out submitting to outside interference.140
b) Critical Examination of These Advantages
Under closer scrutiny, the purported advantages of
this doctrine prove to be somewhat less impressive. Al-
though it is claimed to be more "objective" than "belli-
gerency as a juridical act", in fact the contrary is
true. Scholars are not at all in agreement as to the
factual conditions that are necessary and sufficient
automatically to transform insurgents into belligerents.
For some, these conditions are those of the Reglement of
1900 (i.e., identical to those that allow recognition of
belligerency). 1 4 1  For others, it does not seem to be
139. Wright, International Law and Civil Strife, Proceedings,
American Society of International Law 145, 148 (1959).
140. See Chaumont, Analyse critique de l 'intervention
amricaine au Vietnam, Revue belge de droit international 75 (1968).
Chaumont states: "Un point est incontestable: que ce soit au bene-
fice du gouvernement 6tabli ou d'une autorite de fait, 1 'interven-
tion 6trangere est par definition de nature a aligner la libertg
de choix du peuple". i.e., "One point is indisputable: whether it
be for the benefit of the established government, or of a de facto
authority, foreign intervention is by definition of such a nature
as to alienate the people's freedom of choice".
141. Cf. Lauterpacht, supra note 126, at 104 ("The test which
it is called upon to apply at this point would appear to be analogous
to . . . that which is employed for that purpose of determining
whether it is appropriate to recognize the belligerency of the in-
surgents.").
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necessary that these conditions be fulfilled.1 42 Fur-
thermore, even if there were general agreement on these
factual conditions, the decentralized structure of in-
ternational decision-making would still compel states to
decide whether the said conditions existed in each par-
ticular case.143 It is hard to imagine cases where
reasonable disagreements could not arise,144 By contrast,
142. According to Fitzmaurice, supra note 95, at 179, it
would be necessary and sufficient that the uprising "incarnates the
national will." However, this is a criterion whose application
would be subject to many different interpretations with respect to
any given conflict. This of course returns one to the starting
point, i.e., discretionary "belligerency as a juridical act." For
Wright, supra note 139, at 148, the criterion is that the incumbent
government is prohibited from the moment that the insurgents "jeop-
ardize the government." The same remark as that made regarding the
"national will" can of course be repeated here. Moreover, it
should be noted that this criterion would (paradoxically) encourage
incumbent governments to be extremely authoritarian in order to be
able to quell any incipient dissidence and in such a way prevent
the development of any group that, because it had been tolerated
for some time, could grow to the point where it "jeopardized the
government." Finally, by a circular logic, this opinion could
easily lead to a refusal to tolerate any solicited assistance sim-
ply because it is solicited. See note 128 supra.
143. See p. 205 supra.
144, For example, it is often alleged by a government that
insurgents have received foreign assistance. Such outside aid
would authorize foreign states to aid the incumbent government
through the customary doctrine of collective self-defense, incor-
porated in U.N. Charter art. 41. See Kelsen, Collective Security
and Self Defense Under the U.N. Charter, 42 Am. J. Int'l L. 783
(1948),.
Some authors contest this point of view, but their opinion is
a marginal one difficult to reconcile with state practice. See
Bowett, The Interrelation of Theories of Intervention and Self-
Defense, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World 38-35 (J.E. Moore
ed. 1974). It is not our intention here to discuss the doctrine of
self-defense, but only to suggest that, in cases where a foreign
state is in doubt as to the legal possibility of assisting the in-
cumbent government, it can always "cover itself" by alleging that
illicit aid has been furnished to the insurgents. Such allegations
are effectively made in a growing number of cases. Thus, the
doubts created as to the applicability of the traditional doctrine
have not significantly altered state behavior. Rather, they have
simply added another complicated element, often impossible of veri-
fication, to legal justifications of their behavior. The doctrine
of "belligerency as a state of facts," far from its professed aim
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the doctrine of "belligerency as a juridical act" per-
mits a precise determination of the moment when a neu-
tral regime is instituted.
The doctrine of "belligerency as a state of facts"
is equally open to criticism as regards state sovereign-
ty and independence. Indeed, one could claim that it is
incompatible with such independence. Sovereignty is, of
course, a state prerogative; but the state as a legal
entity can act only through its government, which is the
repository of the attributes of sovereignty. Obviously,
this concept implies the free exercise of state powers
by governmental authority. One of these powers is the
discretionary appeal for help from other states. To
deny the use of this power to the incumbent government
would be truly to limit the sovereignty and the inde-
pendence of the state that it represents.145 Such a
limit on state sovereignty is hard to reconcile with the
oft-expressed will of states -- and especially of
recently created states -- to protect their territorial
integrity, to defend their borders, and to use fully the
powers that have traditionally devolved upon independent
countries. 146
Finally, arguments based on the principle of self-
determination of peoples147 are far from conclusive.148
Such arguments do not take into account the fact that
the principle of "belligerency as a state of facts"
would only aggravate the problem of clandestine aid,
while at the same time encouraging artificial legal jus-
tifications of any aid overtly furnished to the incum-
bents.149 Moreover, these arguments seem to posit that
144. (Continued)
of simplifying or objectifying the law, has burdened it with yet
another variable. This has the effect of making the judicial
appreciation of state actions almost intolerably difficult.
145. This position has been eloquently expressed by many
jurists. See, e.g., 1. D. O'Connell, supra note 78, at 589; C.
Zorgbibe, supra note 35, at 62, 65.
146. See generally J. Charpentier, Institutions interna-
tionales 17 (4th ed. 1972); P. Reuter, Institutions Internationales
80 (6th ed. 1969).
147. See Chaumont, supra note 140.
148. The principle of self-determination of peoples will be
discussed at pp. 44-52 infra.
149. See sources cited note 144 supra.
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a state "left to itself" 1 50 will attain in some miracu-
lous way the "true self-determination" of the "peoples"
that compose it. Such a position, we submit, naively
mistakes brute force for the "will of the people."151
c) State Practice
There are two factors which make it difficult to
determine which doctrine states actually favor. First,
how does one explain cases of inaction by foreign
states? Is it that they feel a legal obligation not to
help the incumbent government C"belligerency as a state
of facts"), or is it rather that they choose not to
grant assistance ("belligerency as a juridical act")?
Clearly, it is exceedingly difficult to offer concrete
proof in support of the doctrine of "belligerency as a
state of facts": every case of isolation of an internal
conflict could possibly be explained by reference to the
"belligerency as a juridical act" doctrine.
Even when this neutrality becomes formalized, the char-
acterization of the situation remains ambiguous. Thus, the
Non-TItervention Agreement, 152 adopted by twenty-nine
150. The meaning of this expression becomes increasingly
problematic in a world where international interactions are in-
creasingly intense, and where aid of all sorts may be granted be-
fore the mysterious moment of belligerency is reached.
151. As Professor Moore states: "The judgment that self-
determination requires that neither the recognized government nor
the insurgents can ever be aided disarmingly conceals the naive
assumption that whatever takes place within the confines of a ter-
ritorial entity is pursuant to genuine self-determination of
peoples, and that outside 'intervention' is necessarily disruptive
of self-determination." Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assis-
tance to the Republic of Vnetnam, 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 30 (1967).
152. See Padelford, The Internatio7nal Non-Intervention Agree-
ment and the Spanish Civil War 31 Am. J. Inttl L. 378 (1937). As
Padelford notes, "there was no one instrument which all signed or
adhered to, in spite of constant employment of the term 'agreement.'
The agreement was merely a concert of policy, and its fulfillment
depended entirely upon the initiative of each state." Id, at 580.
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governments during the Spanish Civil War, constituted for
some the proof of the legal obligation of neutrality;1 5 3
for others, it was nothing more than a collective choice
to abstain from assisting the Spanish government; for
still others, it was an implicit recognition of belli-
gerency under the "juridical act" doctrine.154
Not only is direct state support of the "belliger-
ency as a state of facts" doctrine almost non-existent, 1 5 5
but circumstantial proof in support of the doctrine is
also hard to find. By the same token, proof of the ap-
plication of the doctrine of "belligerency as a juridi-
cal act" is also frequently not as clear as one might
hope.15 6 The tendency among "assisting" states to jus-
tify their aid to the incumbent government by invoking
prior foreign aid to the insurgents1 5 7 singularly
obscures the legal question that aid presents.
153. Lauterpacht, supra note 126 at 105.
154. See sources cited notes 100 & 101 supra. O'Rourke,
Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish Civil War., 31 Am. J.
Int'l L. 398 (1937).
155. Almost, but not completely. Thus, the Chilean delegate
to the General Assembly declared in 1968 that, "In the opinion of
the Chilean delegation, the principle of non-intervention prohibits
all interventions by third-states in the internal or external [sic]
affairs of a state, even at the request of the established govern-
ment," quoted in Pinto, supra note 12, at 283.
156. See pp. 200-06 supra.
157. See note 144 supra; Pinto, supra note 10, at 486. The
incumbent government, by claiming that the rebellion that it is
combatting was "fomented" from beyond its borders, becomes in ef-
fect twice eligible for outside assistance. The "assisting" for-
eign states can justify their acts by invoking not only aid to a
government that requested it, but also collective self-defense.
If the first motive is undermined by doctrinal inconsistencies
based, inter alia, on a conception of the "right" of "peoples" to
self-determination, such is not the case for the second justifica-
tion. It is not surprising, then, that recourse to this technique,
which blurs an otherwise relatively straightforward situation, is
increasingly common. See, e.g., Le Monde, Aug. 22 and Dec. 26,
1968 (concerning the Biafra conflict) and Dec. 29, 1969 (regarding
the Kurdish revolt in Iraq).
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Second, it is difficult not to acknowledge that the
legality of assistance to the incumbent government (i.e.,
the "belligerency as a juridical act" doctrine) appears
to be confirmed by unambiguous cases. Numerous declara-
tions to this effect have been made.158 Even the disci-
ples of the "belligerency as a state of facts" doctrine
recognize that foreign states often assist incumbent
governments, despite the fact that an objective "state
of belligerency" clearly exists.1 5 9 Many examples have
already been alluded to. The recent American refusal
legally to condemn the Soviet and Cuban aid to Ethiopia,
as long as the assistance serves only to suppress the
internal rebellion, is one. Other examples could be
mentioned: the British and Soviet aid to Nigeria in the
Biafran conflict Cwhereas the states that had recognized
Biafra refused to provide it with overt military assis-
tance); 1 6 0 the Soviet aid to Iraq to combat Kurdish
rebels; the Greek conflict of the 'fortiesl6l. There is
158. For example, the claim made by Ambassador Fish, p. 190
supra. In 1957, when the British assisted the Sultan of Muscat in
suppressing a five-year-old rebellion, the British Foreign Secre-
tary justified this intervention in the following terms: "This is
an internal affair relating to the Sultan of Muscat. The fact that
he has appealed to us does not, in our view, oblige us to inform
the United Nations," quoted in Lauterpacht, supra note 126, at 101.
One year later, John Foster Dulles, dealing with the U.S. inter-
vention in Lebanon, summarized the American legal position as fol-
lows: "We do not introduce American forces into foreign countries
except on the invitation of the lawful government of the State
concerned." 38 Dep't State Bull. 947 (1958). Similar statements
were also made by the French government regarding its aid to Zaire
in 1978, and by the Cuban government concerning its current mili-
tary presence in several African countries.
159. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 103, at 431-33.
160. See Wodie, supra note 28, at 1045-46.
161. From 1944 on, Great Britain openly furnished military
assistance to the Greek government so that it could resist a Marx-
ist-oriented revolutionary movement. This overt aid was never
denounced by an international body. Three years later, the Greek
government complained about the reciprocal, but quite limited, aid
that Communist states had subsequently given to the insurgents.
The General Assembly reacted on October 21, 1947, by inviting the
states involved to refrain from helping these "franc-tireurs." See
G.A. Res. 109, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 12 (1947).
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little point in attempting an exhaustive enumeration
here.16 2 Finally, several multilateral agreements (such
as the 1957 Havana Protocol)1 63 and bilateral trea-
ties,164 from the distant pastl 6 5 up to modern times,
confirm international practice in this area.
International behavior demonstrates that aid soli-
cited by an incumbent government is furnished openly.
Benefiting from a presumption of efficacy, and not yet
having completely lost its power, the incumbent govern-
ment can legally solicit aid from foreign states. In
contrast, assistance given to the party in revolt before
it exercises exclusive power on the contested territory
is illicit and thus usually covert. Premature recogni-
tion of the insurgents as the "legal government," which
often accompanies such assistance,1 6 6 is yet another
indicator of the contemporary state of the doctrine of
aid to the incumbent government.
162. See Brownlie, supra note 11, at 322, for examples of
several other unambiguous cases. 2 A. Kiss, supra note 52, at 411,
demonstrates that French practice consists of justifying aid to
the lawful government (e.g., aid to Gabon in 1964, to Chad since
1968, to Zaire in 1977-78). Anglo-American practice has already
been illustrated several times. Thus, the American "assistance"
to the Guatemalan and Nicaraguan governments in 1960 was "requested"
by the incumbent governments. See 5 14. Whiteman, supra note 52, at
534-35.
163. See note 83 supra.
164 See Brownlie, supra note 11, at 543.
165. In 1823, Simon Bolivar required that a treaty between
Mexico and Colombia include the following "guarantee clause": "If,
by misfortune, the internal calm of one of these states is disturbed
by turbulent men, . . . both parties shall undertake to form a com-
mon front against them, assisting each other by whatever means are
in their power, until law and order are reestablished," quoted in
Pinto, supra note 10., at 471.
166. This was the case during the Spanish and Algerian Civil
Wars, among others. More recently, the premature recognition of
the Sandinista Liberation Front (F.S.L.N.) as the legal government
of Nicaragua preceded or accompanied the aid of several States to
these insurgents. Again, this behavior illustrates both the con-
tinuing normative force of the principle legalizing aid to incum-
bent governments, and the operational weakness of such norms in a
decentralized decision-making structure. See C. Zorgbibe, supra
note 35, at 130.
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III. Belligerency as Flar: The Principle of Symmetric
Aid
Our doctrinal study would not be complete without
mentioning a principle which gives rige to the third a
priori option previously enumerated.1 7 Again, this
opinion is not a novel one. In the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury, Vattel stated that:
Any foreign power may legally assist an
oppressed people that asks for such
assistance
...Eif] conflict degenerates into a
civil war, foreign powers may aid the
party whose cause they find the most
just.1 6 8
Several contemporary scholars also plead in favor
of the legality of the "symmetric aid" doctrine. That
is, foreign states may not foment an internal conflict;
but once it has broken out, they may assist the faction
of their choice.16 9
The basis of this doctrine deserves some examina-
tion. Like the "belligerency as a state of facts"
principle, the principle of "symmetric aid" places the
parties to the conflict on an equal footing as soon as
hostilities become pronounced. While a neutrality
regime reigns under the doctrine of "belligerency as a
state of facts," the doctrine of "symmetric aid" analo-
gizes the internal conflict to a war between two sover-
eign states, and thus allows each party to receive
167, See p, 179 supra.
168. E. de Vattel, Le droit des gens ou le principe de la
loi naturelle 56 (Book IV Paris 1758). The original French reads:
1tToute puissance etrangere est un droit de soutenir un peuple
opprime qui lui demande son assistance," and, "(si) les choses en
viennent a une guerre civile, les puissances etrangeres peuvent
assister celui des deux partis qui leur paralt fonde en justice."
See also Carnazza-Amari, Nouvel expose du principe de non-interven-
tion, 5 Recueil des cours 552.
169. See note 82 supra.
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assistance from its allies,170
We have already discussed in some detail the legal
criticisms of any doctrine which provides for equal
treatment of all parties to an internal conflict in a
world composed of sovereign nation-states.1 7 1 The doc-
trine of "symmetric aid" has the additional disadvantage
of failing to respect the norm prohibiting the use of
force in international relations. 172 Intervention to
help rebels, in effect, constitutes an aggression
against the state in turmoil and is thus a violation of
the most essential norm of contemporary international
law.1 7 3 As for international practice, the behavior of
states who assist insurgents confirms the illicit char-
acter of such actions.14
170. See Falk, The International Law of Internal Wars: Prob-
lems and Prospects, in Legal Order in a Violent World 122 Falk ed.
1968).
171. See pp. 212-1- supra.
172. The classic codification of this norm is U.N. Charter
art. 2, para. 4. It is of no avail to invoke art. 51 as an excep-
tion to art. 2, para. 4 in this case. Collective self-defense is
exercised at the request of the government that holds the title to
state sovereignty and not at the demand of the belligerents who
aspire to that title.
173. See p. 33 supra, The situation was hardly different
before the San Francisco conference. Scelle, supra note 64, at 272.
174. See notes 103 & 162 supra. The thorny question of the
so-called "humanitarian right" to assist insurgents in certain cases
will not be discussed here. See generally Schindler, supra note
103, at 480, articles reprinted in 82 Revue gqnerale du droit inter-
national public 5-234 (1978). Furthermore, this article excludes
those cases where both belligerent parties exercised sovereign
powers before the onset of the conflict. See note 112 supra,
In addition to the examples already cited, it might be useful
to recall other cases where aid to insurgents was accompanied by the
latter's sudden metamorphosis into the incumbent government. When
aid to insurgents is not covert it is often purportedly provided to
"incumbents." Thus, the Palestine Liberation Organization (P.L.O.)
is recognized by many states as the only "lawful government" of
"Palestine," and is equipped with a "cabinet" and a sophisticated
tax structure to facilitate its "governmental" operations. Aid pro-
vided to the P.L.O., instead of supporting the 'belligerency as war"
position, illustrates the legal weakness of this doctrine and the
longevity (at least on a formal level) of the principle of the
legality of aid to incumbent governments. See note 162 supra. The
conflicts in Cyprus, Katanga, and the Western Sahara are also quite
revealing on this point.
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Chapter 2, Some Comments on Internal Conflicts, Foreign
States, and the Principle of Self-Determina-
t-ton
Preliminary Remarks
On November 13, 1974, the head of a "liberation
movement" addressed the United Nations General Assembly
in order to explain to its members that foreign states
may legally assist insurgents fighting to obtain "self-
determination. "175
Many jurists have also defended the right of "peo-
ples" to receive foreign aid in the exercise of their
"right" to determine their political future.17 6 For
others, this "right" implies an obligation of neutrality
in every situation where a "people's" self-determination
is involved.1 7 7 The principle of the right of peoples
to self-determination may thus support both the "belli-
gerency as a state of facts" and the "symmetric aid"
doctrines.l78 Analysis of this principle is therefore
in order.
A preliminary caveat is perhaps appropriate. It is
not intended that the following reflections be construed
as a detailed analysis of the status of the right of
self-determination in positive international law. Ade-
quate treatment of this complex question would exceed
the aims of this paper.1 7 9  Hence, we shall satisfy our-
175. The leader referred to is Yassir Arafat.
176. See generally sources cited notes 82 & 157 supra.
177. Schindler, supra note 103, at 25. See sources cited
notes 126 & 131 supra.
178. Some authorities conclude that this principle permits
foreign states to assist the insurgents-but not the incumbent gov-
ernment, particularly in colonial wars. See Pinto, supra note 10,
at 494.
179. See generally S. Calogeropoulos-Stratis, Le droit des
peuples a disposer d'eux-mmes (1973); Chowdhury, The Status and
Norms of Self-Determination in Contemporary International Law, in
Essays on International Law and Relations, supra note 96, at 72;
Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. Inttl L. 459 (1971); Green,
Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israel Conflict, Proc..
Am. Soc'y Int'l L. 40 (1971); Guilhaudis, supra note 90; Menan, The
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selves with examining whether actual practice, or the
multilateral conventions and declarations enunciating
the "self-determination" principle, seem to justify set-
ting aside the tradition of aid to the incumbent govern-
ment.
I The Ambiguity of Texts and Declarations
A. The Texts
President Woodrow Wilson tried to insert into arti-
cle X of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which
reaffirmed the principles of state sovereignty and ter-
ritorial inviolability, a provision to the effect that
the right of self-determination would have priority over
these other two principles. His efforts were unsuccess-
ful. The international community did not want to sub-
ordinate state sovereignty and inviolability to the xer-
cise of the right of peoples to self-determination.1 0
This fundamental conflict between, on the one hand,
the claimed rights of "peoples" and, on the other, state
prerogatives, is essential to the understanding of our
problem. There is little doubt that, since the Second
World War, political independence has become a "synonym
of liberty, of justice, of equality, of good", while
colonization, to the cogtrary, is regarded "as plunder,
as the ultimate evil. Il 1  The first article of the Uni-
ted Nations Charter, for example, states that one of the
goals of the United Nations is:
179. (Continued)
Right to Self-Determination; A Historical Appraisal, 53 Revue de
droit international et de la science diplomatique 272 (1975); Nanda,
Self-Determination in International Law, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 32 (1972)
K. Rabl, Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der V8lker (1973); A. Rigo-Sureda
The Evaluation Of the Right of Self-Determination (1973).
180. See Farer, supra note 72, at 330.
181. Guilhaudis, supra note 179 at 19-20. The original text
reads "Synonyme de liberte, de jvstice, d" galZit, de bien," and
"conmne une course au tresor, come 
le al."
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1(2) To develop friendly relations
among nations, based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples.,.1 8 2
It is, however, neither obvious nor inevitable that
this article, or the evolution which it signifies, con-
firms the thesis of Mr. Arafat. If self-determination
of "peoples" is a principle of which the international
community approves, the application of this principle
must be within the normative framework that this com-
munity defines This framework is one of states and not
one of peoples183, as we may discern from some other key
articles in the Charter, including: Article 2(1) (sanc-
tioning state sovereignty); Article 27) (limiting '.N.
intervention in domestic affairs); and, especially,
Article 2(4) (prohibiting the extra-territorial use of
force).
As Hans Kelsen has pointed out, the Charter grants
specific rights to states, rather than to "peoples."
Despite its language, when seen in the context of the
Charter as a whole, the second paragraph of its first
article does appear to deal with states rather than peo-
ples. In that sense, it corresponds to the principle
of "sovereign equality" that is proclaimed in the first
paragraph of Article 2.184 Thus read, the word "people"
constitutes a special reference, not to itself, but to
the human element of a state. This pattern of reference
may be read back into the phrase "We, the people of the
United Nations" in the preamble of the Charter. Other
multilateral texts have adopted the same formula.1 5
"Self-determination of peoples" then (except in
colonial situations which, apart from the ones in Rhodesia,
Namibia and several minuscule territories are declining
182. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. See also U.N. Charter
art. 55 (international economic and social cooperation).
183. Even the name of "The United Nations" is misleading, as
the U.N. was and is clearly an organization of states rather than
of nations or peoples. See Rostow, supra note 89, at 848 (quoting
Gunnar Myrdal).
184. H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations 51-53 (1951).
See also Chaumont, L'O.N.U. 56 (1968); L. Goodrich & E. Hambro,
Commentaire de la charte des Nations-Unies 115 (1948).
185. See note 94 supra.
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in importancel 8 6 ) often may not be an alternative to the
right of states to determine their future, When applied
to states, the idea of self-determination tends to pro-
tect and perfect sovereignty, rather than to undermine
it. In this context, it can easily be seen that assis-
tance to insurgents who do not represent states, but who
combat such representatives, would violate basic treaty
principles. Likewise, requests for aid by incumbent
state governments (except in real "colonial" situa-
tionsl171 would, if answered affirmatively, probably be
in accord with such principles.1 8 8
186. In this article the term "colonial" is used in the
strictly judicial sense, not in the larger sociological sense.
Thus, although some Quebecois or Ulsterites may feel that they live
in "colonies," the point is that these territories are component
parts of states, and that few areas of the globe have not yet been
partitioned into states.
187 , Id.
188. A complicated question concerns the legality of a for-
eign state furnishing military aid to an incumbent government whose
avowed goal is to deny the self-determination of a "people." Argu-
ably, this would constitute the use of force in a "manner inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the United Nations." U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 4. The problem is, of course, in large part one of deter-
mining if the internal conflict in question involves the exercise
of "self-determination," and if the group involved qualifies as a
"people" who are denied this right. See Calogeropoulos-Stratis,
supra note 179 at 45.
Shindler, supra note 103, at 445, concludes that: 'IV paratt
clairement illicite d'aider une puissance coloniale 'a rprimer
l'insurrection d'un peuple colonial. En revanche, la situation est
beaucoup moins claire pour des guerres de secession qui ne sont pas
en m~me temps des guerres de Ziberation coloniale," i.e., "It
appears clearly illicit to help a colonial power repress insurrec-
tion by a colonial [i.e., colonized] people. On the other hand,
the situation is -much less clear for wars of secession which are
not at the same time wars of colonial liberation." The contempor-
ary practice whereby foreign states condemn an incumbent govern-
mentts suppression of the colonial uprisings (e.g., Namibia) would
appear to confirm the first part of this opinion. However, the
colonial problem, as indicated above, is no longer the most common
one, as the majority of "liberation movements" now operate within
states.
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B. The Declarations
The Charter of the United Nations has of course
been "supplemented" by numerous resolutions emanating
from that agency's principal organ, the General Assembly.
Although the Assembly has, "neither explicitly nor *m-
plicitly, received any sort of legislative power,"1A °
it would not be unreasonable to conclude that an unani-
mous (or near-unanimous) resolution represents an inter-
pretation of the Charter,1 9 0 and would thus be consider-
ed declaratory of international law. Such declarations
could not, of course, abrogate a fundamental principle
of international law, such as that of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of states. Indeed, this has
never been their purpose.
Thus, in 1960, the General Assembly reaffirmed the
"inalienable right" of "colonial peoples" to self-deter-
mination, while at the same time emphasizing that any
attempt to destroy the territorial integrity of states
was incompatible with the aims and principles of the
Charter.19 1 Five years later, the Assembly again
brought together the two principles of self-determina-
tion of "peoples" and the sovereignty of states, in its
"Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States, and the Protection of
their Independence and Sovereignty."1 9 2
Probably "the most important official document pro-
duced on this question" 1 9 3 is the "Declaration of Princi-
ples of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
189. Virally, Droit international et dcolonisation devant
les Nations Unies," Annuaire franrais de droit international 535
(1963). See also U.N. Charter arts. 10, 11.
190. See Vienna Convention On the Law of Treaties, 1969,
art. 31, para. 3(a); Bastid, Observations sur une 'tape dans Ze
developpement progressif et la codification des principes du droit
international, in Recueil d'gtudes en droit international en hom-
mage a Paul Guggenhem 138 (1968).
191. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc.
A/L.328 (1960).
192. G.A. Res. 2131, arts. 5 & 6, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
14) 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
193. Brossard, supra note 112, at 80. See also G.A. Res.
3314, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.31) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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and Cooperation among States"t194 of 1970. Its preamble
emphasizes the "significant contribution to contemporary
international law" represented by the "principle of
equal rights of peoples and of their right to self-
determination", and posits concurrently:
That any attempt to destroy, either
partially or totally, the territorial
integrity of a state or a country, or
to interfere with its political
independence, is inconsistent with the
purposes of the Charter.
The history of intense negotiations that determined
the content of the Declaration is particularly informa-
tive. 1 9 5 Representatives of ten states proposed that
the following words be inserted in the Declaration:
Peoples who are deprived of their
legitimate right of self-determina-
tion and complete freedom are entitled
to exercise their inherent right of
self-defense, by virtue of which they
may receive assistance from other
States.196
These ten states claimed that the right of collec-
tive self-defense was vested in peoples. Aid to such
"peoples", they contended, was therefore not a violation
of Article 2(4) of the Charter. This opinion was hotly
contested by other states, which pointed out that this
right belonged only to sovereign states, and that its
exercise by so-called "peoples" would have disastrous
consequences for international public order.1 9 7 Read in
the light of these legal debates, several excerpts from
the official text of the Declaration are of particular
interest:
194. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N.
Doc. A/8028 (1970).
195. See Schwebel ars of Liberation as Fought in U.N.
Organs, in Law and Civil War in the Modern World, supra note 144,
at 446.
196. Id., at 451.
197. Id. at 451-452. See also note 172 supra.
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Every state has the duty to refrain from
any forcible action which deprives peoples
.,. of their right to self-determination
and freedom and independence. In their
actions against, and resistance to, such
forcible action in pursuit of the exercise
of their right to self.determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and receive
support in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the Charter. Nothing in the
foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as
enlarging or diminishing in any way the
scope of the provisions of the Charter con-
cerning cases in which the use of force is
lawful, 198
Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted by the General Assembly
without any official vote, has been called "a master-
piece in ambiguity"1 9 9 in its treatment of foreign state
obligations during an internal conflict. It restates,
without at all resolving, the dilemma of attempting to
promote "peoples" rights to self-determination in a
legal system whose functional unit is the state. Except
in the face of the classical colonial situation, the
principles of territorial integrity and of the illegal-
ity of non-government-requested intervention seem to
emerge relatively unscathed from multilateral texts and
declarations. 200
II State Practice
State practice tends to confirm both the legality
of aid to incumbent governments in non-colonial situa-
198. (Emphasis supplied). State sovereignty and territorial
integrity, as well as the prohibition of the inter-state use of
force without government request, are all among the most important "pur-
poses and principles of the Charter."
199. Guilhaudis, supra note 90, at 126.
200. See also Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 Am.
J. Int'l L. 732 (1971); J.-J. Salmon, La reconnaissance d'6tat 161




tions and the prohibition of aid to insurgents, despite
the eyolution of the "self-determination" doctrine.
The Biafran conflict has already been alluded to as
a case in point. Assistance was overtly granted to the
Lagos regime, and African leaders openly favored "pre-
serving the unity of the State of Nigeria." 2 0 1 In
Cformerly) Eastern Pakistan, India hesitated openly to
support Bengali rebels and felt obliged to allege a
Pakistani attack on Indian territory to justify its in-
tervention, (India, a multi-ethnic State par excellence,
surely realized the possible consequences of any exten-
sion of "self-determination" doctrines.) Even as Bangla-
desh proclaimed its independence amid harsh repression
from the Karachi government, no state would openly pro-
claim the right of the Bengali "people" to its political
self-determination.2 0 2 One scholar has called the
Nigerian and Pakistani experiences, respectively, "the
extreme unction and the formal burial" of any "national
liberation" theory of foreign state intervention.2 0 3
Similar cases come to mind, from the so-called in-
ternational "conspiracy of sil nce" during the rebellion
of Iraq's Kurdish population20 4 to the atrociously cruel
massacre of Hutu-tribe rebels in Burundi. 2 0 5 Indeed,
the states created during post-World War II decoloniza-
tion often value most highly the principles of terri-
torial integrity and state sovereignty. Third World
nations often stigmatize any "wars of national libera-
tion" in which they have no strategic interest. 2 0H The
201. Salmon, supra note 185, at 161.
202. See Guilhaudis, supra note 90, at 58.
203. Farer, supra note 72, at 354.
204. See Fontaine, Le maLheur d'~tre Kurde, Le Monde, March
19, 1975 at 3, col. 5.
205. Two hundred fifty thousand Hutus were exterminated by
government troops loyal to President Micombero, who was attempting
to "unify" his country. The O.A.U. sent the following congratula-
tory message to the President after the Hutu rebellion had been
crushed: "Thanks to your actions, peace will be rapidly restored,
national unity consolidated, and territorial integrity preserved."
Farer, supra note 72, at 402.
206. Compare the declarations of several states during the
discussions preceding the adoption of General Assembly Resolution
2131 in 1965: Mexico, 20 U.N. GAOR (1408th plen. mtg.) 6-16.
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Communist bloc, which proudly voices support for many
"liberation fronts" has expressly denied even the print-
ciple self-determination of states, 2 0 7 and is actively
assisting the incumbent government of Ethiopia in its
efforts to crush the attempts of two different "peoples"
to "determine their future." Not only have the Western
nations not contested the legality of this assistance,20
8
but they have on the contrary emphasized the principle
of territorial integrity.2 0 9
It is, then, completely inaccurate to claim that
state practice confirms any legal right to assist
ethnic insurgents or any legal obligation not to assist
incumbent governments which combat such insurgents. In
a world composed of nation-states, the vast majority of
which are multi-ethnic, one scholar has aptly concluded
that:
Ctest un mythe qui m~ne le jeu, le
mythe de ltunit6 nationale et de
l'intggrit6 territoriale. Construit
autour de l'Etat et non du mouvement
de libgration, ce mythe a impos6 son
dictat - des 'peuples' lui ont 6t6
sacrifigs2 1 0
Conclusion
Our examination of the state of positive law reveals
no fundamental modification since the days of the
Caroline and Alabama affairs. Foreign states must not
aid insurgents, but may assist incumbent governments un-
til a juridical act has bound them to passive neutrality.
We have seen that this doctrine suffers from important
drawbacks. But we have also seen that the international
community has yet to replace it with another normative
system.
207. See note 114 supra.
208. I.e., "It is a myth which guides the action, the myth
of national unity and of territorial integrity. Built around the
State and not the liberation movement, this -myth has imposed its
own dictate--'peoples' have been sacrificed to it." See note 116
supra.
209. See_ e.g., Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S.
News and World Report, Feb. 13, 1978, at 31.
210. Guilhaudis, supra note 90, at 59.
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INTERNAL CONFLICTS
Of course, our study should not obscure the impor-
tant--and often contrary--socio-political reality allud-
ed to in the introduction, Since 1945, with increasing
covert interventions and the spread of the "Cold War"
to the four corners of the globe, illicit foreign state
interventions in internal conflicts :have certainly been
a prime cause of international tension.21 1
The socio-political factors inherent in what can
only be described as a lessening of the influence of
international law on state behavior have been well docu-
mented elsewhere, 212 We provide a biief summary, here:
1. The communication revolution has per.,
mitted world-wide exposure for competing
(and, since World War II, increasingly
incompatible) ideologies, At the same
time, this "shrinking" of the world has
led to an expansion of each blocts zone
of strategic interest. Thus, internal
affairs of formerly isolated states take
on an increasing importance for that
state's peers. Indeed, the division of
the world into ideological blocs (a pheno-
menon not sufficiently understood at the
San Francisco conference) reinforces each
bloc's impression that the outcome of every
foreign internal conflict is vital to its
own security. Thus, considerable pressure
is placed on traditional legal norms by
states which are constantly tempted to
"arrange" things their way. Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and Chile are the results.
2. Military technology has advanced to the point
where direct inter-bloc confrontations could
have decidedly disastrous effects on the
world. Internal conflicts, on the other
hand, permit inter-bloc competition at less
risk, One scholar has concluded that:
211. Obviously, internal conflicts may at times be mere
international wars fought by proxy. Thus, the People's Republic of
Vietnam has attempted to camouflage its recent invasion of Cambodia
as an indigenous rebellion by a group which, of course, Hanoi quick-
ly recognized as the incumbent government, i.e., eligible for overt
Vietnamese aid. See Le Devoir, Oct. 27, 1978, at 9.
212. See R. Oglesby, supra note 6, at 134, for an especial-
ly interesting analysis.
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The C.I.A. and Cominform, rather than
traditional armed forces, have become
the protagonists of contemporary world
struggle.213
International society reacted passively to the
Brezhnev doctrine in 1968 and hardly blinked when South
Vietnam was invaded in 1973, Israel watches helplessly
as foreign states arm Palestinian guerillas, leaving the
Israeli government little choice but to rely on force.
Indeed, the inter-state use of force in self-defense has
become the prime sanction against violations of Article
2(4) of the Charter.2 In this field of positive in-
ternational law, as in others, 2 1 5 norms seem to be pro-
gressively transformed from influences on state behavior
to mere determinants of the form and rhetoric of state
actions. It is in this context that Justice Holmes'
thoughtful words take on a new relevance: "It commands
the future: a valid ideal, but imperfectly achieved."
POSTSCRIPT
The Afghanistan crisis, which occurred just after
this article was completed, serves as a poignant reminder
both of the contemporary state of law and of its chronic
violation by the Soviet bloc.
Thus, Moscow presented its invasion of Afghanistan
as a reply to a request for aid by the Kabul government,
in its fight against moujahidin insurgents. The latter
are apparently "counter-revolutionary, counter-progres-
sive elements Who are toys in the hands of international
imperialism.''216 This Soviet attempt to mask classic
aggression by recourse to internal-conflict rhetoric
brings to mind similar efforts in 1956 (Hungary), 1968
213. Luard, Civil Conflicts in Modern International Rela-
tions, in The International Regulation of Civil Wars 9 (E. Luard ed.
1972).
214, See Rostow, supra note 12, at 286.
215. Id.
216. Interview with the new editor of the Kabul News-Times,
reprinted in Le Monde, Jan. 9, 1980.
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(Czechoslovakia) and 1979 (Cambodia).2 1 7 Executions of
the Afghan Chief of State, his four wives, and their
offspring obviously did not render Moscow's explanations
any more plausible; and they were resoundingly rejected
by Security Council and General Assembly majorities.
As Babrak Karmal attempts to become a second Janos
Kadar, one can only reflect sadly that the conquest of
Afghanistan illustrates both the continued force of the
norm permitting aid to incumbent governments (why else
would Moscow attempt so absurdly to legitimize its in-
vasion in this way?) and its increasing perversion to
ends totally incompatible with world order.
217. In the last case, the aggressor was, of course, the
Soviet surrogate, Vietnam.
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